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EMPIRICAL PAPERS ABOUT ADVICE TAKING IN MARKETING 
Using advice in decision making is widespread for all sorts of important personal and
professional decisions. Yet, traditional research on individual decision making has failed to
systematically study the impact that social interactions about a decision problem can have
on the decision outcome. A separate literature stream about advice giving and taking
emerged in the 1980s in order to model a decision making structure where one person is
responsible for the final decision, but seeks advice from one or more other persons as input
in the decision making process. To date, a breadth of research questions have been addressed
in order to gradually develop a theory of advice taking. This dissertation is a bundle of three
empirical papers on advice taking in marketing that each studies a specific topic within the
advice taking domain. Using similar experimental methodologies, the papers bundled in
this thesis all find and discuss variable utilization of advice based on the manipulation of
one element in the advice situation: advisor wealth, advice justification, and emotions expe -
rienced by the decision maker. As such, each of the papers offers some interesting manage -
rial implications and contributes to the development of a more comprehensive theory of
advice taking in its own right.
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 Chapter 1  
An Introduction to Advice Taking 
  
 
We often seek advice from others before making decisions. Whether it is something as 
simple as deciding to buy a red or a green dress or to travel by car or by train, or something 
more complex as determining a first bid on your dream house or investing your savings in 
stocks or bonds, more often than not we are keen on getting other people´s opinion about 
something that matters to us. Not only in our private lives, but also in our professions we 
tend not to make important decisions in isolation. Before undertaking major initiatives 
such as company downsizing or launching a new product, managers often deliberate a 
desired course of action with colleagues, or hire external consultants to provided detailed 
advice.  
Given that using advice in decision making is omnipresent, surprisingly little 
empirical research has focused on understanding the factors that influence advice taking 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). This dissertation is a collection of three empirical papers, each 
focusing on a different element of the advice taking process: characteristics of the advisor 
(Chapter 2), characteristics of the advice (Chapter 3) and characteristics of the decision 
maker (Chapter 4). Each of these papers contributes to the development of the advice 
literature in its own right. This introductory chapter is meant to be instructive about the 
current state of knowledge on advice taking, such that the reader will be able to put each of 
the subsequent chapters in a broader theoretical perspective. Before continuing with an 
overview of the advice literature, it is first important to define what “advice” actually 
comprises and what sets the advice literature apart from the general literature on decision 
making.  
 
What is advice? 
  “Advice” is formally defined as a “recommendation regarding a decision or 
course of conduct: counsel” (Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary). But perhaps, as 
also proposed by Bonaccio and Dalal (2006), it would be preferable to adopt a definition of 
“advice” based on theory and empirical results, instead of a dictionary definition. It 
appears as if the operationalization of advice as a recommendation is too narrow as it often 
does not reflect a decision maker’s goals for seeking advice (Gibbons, 2003). Cross, 
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Borgati and Parker (2001) indentified five different types of advice: solutions, meta-
knowledge, problem reformulation, validation and legitimization. The different types of 
advice were found to be ordered along a single dimension in the specific order mentioned 
before, in such a way that an advisor providing one type of advice is also likely to provide 
all the “lower” types of advice. Cross, Borgatti and Parker furthermore argued that 
advisors often naturally provide solutions first, and then also other types of advice that 
may be less concrete or explicit. In a similar vein, according to Bonaccio and Dalal (2006), 
advice may best be conceptualized by a higher-order model in such a way that what we 
generally identify as the “advice” actually subsumes a number of different, lower-order, 
advice elements. These authors name the provision for or against a specific 
recommendation, or the provision of guidance on how to make the final decision, as 
example of such lower-order advice facets. I believe it is insightful for the reader to 
appreciate the elements that might be inclusive in a single ‘piece of advice’, especially 
because throughout the studies reported in this dissertation, the offered advice mostly 
comes in the form of a narrative incorporating different advice elements (i.e. validation or 
legitimization, or provisions for and against a specific recommendation). In this 
dissertation, when referring to “advice” I am referring to it in its broader conceptualization 
that may consist of more than a mere recommendation.   
 Throughout this chapter, I will use the term advice utilization (or advice taking) to 
refer to the extent to which a decision maker follows advice. Conversely, I will use the 
term advice discounting to refer to the extent to which a decision maker does not follow 
advice. Both terms will be used interchangeably as the use of one implies the use of the 
other. 
 
Advice taking literature is (not) an island 
 Most people who are experts in social sciences and in the field of decision making 
in particular might wonder, when reading the remainder of this chapter, why there is a 
separate literature stream about advice taking that almost behaves as if it is an island. 
Reason is that the field of judgment and decision making has not paid attention to the role 
that social interactions about a decision problem might play in individual decision making 
in a systematic way (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; also see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). 
Notably, a literature stream that does take into account that decision makers often do not 
make decisions alone is the “small groups” literature (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Wittenbaum 
& Stasser, 1996). However, research in this area is typically concerned with how members 
in freely interacting groups—who share the exact same responsibility for the final 
decision—share and discuss information to arrive at an outcome (Van Swol & Ludutsky, 
2007). Yet, in most real-world social organizations, people have well-defined roles and 
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different responsibilities. A lot of decisions thus appear to be made within a structure that 
is not well-captured by one individual deciding alone (the focus of classic work on 
decision making) or by different members of a group deciding together (the focus of small 
groups literature). Specifically, decisions are often made by one individual after consulting 
one or more other people for advice. It is to model such decision making structures that 
scholars began to conduct research on advice giving and advice taking during decisions. 
Research on advice taking is about two and a half decade old (Brehmer and Hagafors 
published the first paper in 1986), and is only now mature enough to start informing and 
start being informed by other areas of research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), and to set sail 
off the island. 
The informed reader might also observe that the advice literature is akin to 
persuasion and attitude change literature. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that 
the reasons for (advice) sources and decision makers to interact together are very different 
in a persuasion situation than in an advice situation. In a persuasion setting, the incentive 
often lies with the source to persuade the decision maker to adopt his point of view, for his 
own benefit (i.e. when a salesperson says, “You look amazing in that dress—you should 
really buy it!”). Whereas in an advice setting, the incentive often lies with the decision 
maker to get the source to ventilate his point of view, for the decision maker’s own 
consideration (i.e. when a friend says, “That dress is not really flattering on you—I would 
not buy it”). Hence, you would expect that a decision maker would evaluate the same 
recommendation differently in an advice versus in a persuasion setting, because the rules 
of the game and the roles of the persons interacting with one another are simply different. 
A similar story holds for research about compliance and social influence that is also related 
to research on advice taking. In a compliance situation the decision maker is the one 
approached by another person and is being urged to fulfill a request in a desired way 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; also see Gino, Sheng, & Croson, 2008).  In contrast, in an 
advice situation, the decision maker himself is the one who approaches another person for 
advice and, upon receiving it, is left with the option to take or leave the advice. To put it 
differently, advisors do not make requests but only present their opinion. Again another 
related area of research is that on word-of-mouth communication. Here also, one person 
usually gives a recommendation (either implicit or explicit) to another person. However, 
whereas word-of-mouth generally concerns (either rewarded or unrewarded) product or 
company recommendations by customers, advice giving and taking is not limited to such 
situations and can be about anything. Moreover, the actors in an advice setting can take on 
many roles different from that of (potential) customers. Nevertheless, the different areas of 
research have sufficient common ground to be informed by each other and are suggestive 
of certain relationships that might also hold for advice taking. For that reason, I have not 
turned a blind eye to the general findings in related areas of decision making research in 
the subsequent literature review about advice taking. 
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Taking or leaving advice 
A first step in appreciating what leads decision makers to take or leave advice, is 
to understand why people seek advice in the first place. Primary reasons, pertaining to 
decision quality, are to share accountability for the decision outcome and to increase the 
odds that the final decision will be the best one (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004). 
Deliberating an issue with others prior to making a decision may bring new information or 
alternatives to the table that were previously not considered by decision makers (Heath & 
Gonzalez, 1997) and may force them to think of the decision problem in a novel way 
(Schotter, 1993). Moreover, advice could act as a retrieval cue, reminding decision makers 
of information they had failed to recover from memory themselves (Yaniv, Meyer, & 
Davidson, 1995). Research has found that accuracy benefits can indeed be obtained by 
integrating advice from multiple sources (Budescu & Rantilla, 1997; Soll, 1999; Yaniv, 
2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). A secondary reason to listen to advice is socially 
grounded: decision makers may simply be reluctant to decline freely offered advice 
(Sniezek & Buckley, 1995).  
Yet, one of the most reproduced findings in the advice literature, is that of 
“egocentric discounting” (Yaniv, 2000; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2004). Even though research 
has found that integrating different opinions increases decision accuracy, scholars often 
observed that decision makers do not follow their advisor’s recommendations to an extent 
that they could truly benefit from it. Instead, they overweigh their own opinion relative to 
their advisor’s and thus discount the advice egocentrically (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2004). Decision makers have been found to adjust their opinion 
towards the opinion of their advisor by 25% on average (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Soll & 
Larrick, 1999). Different explanations for this phenomenon have been put forward in the 
literature. According to Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000; also see Yaniv, 2004), it occurs 
because decision makers have access to (the strength of) the underlying reasons supporting 
their own opinion, but are often unaware of the web of thoughts underlying their advisor’s 
opinion. Hence, they have little evidence to justify their advisor’s opinion or to assess it for 
accuracy and they tend to discount it accordingly.  
Alternatively, egocentric discounting has been argued to occur by an anchor and 
adjustment mechanism (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring is a process by which 
someone´s initial opinion functions as an anchor that is (unconsciously) used in the 
evaluation of subsequent information, such that the anchor may be insufficiently adjusted 
upon receiving new input (i.e. the advice) (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Lim & O’Connor, 
1995). Again another explanation, proposed by Krueger (2003), is that of an egocentric 
bias. Decision makers may always prefer their own opinion over that of others, because 
they consider it superior. Egocentrism is different from anchor and adjustment in the sense 
that the former is a long-term process, whereas the latter is a short-term and temporary 
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process (Harvey & Harries, 2004). In their paper, Harvey and Harries (2004) showed 
results that demonstrate longer-term discounting effects than those usually associated with 
the anchor and adjustment paradigm. Moreover, they found that decision makers attached 
greater weight to someone else’s forecasts that were incorrectly labeled their own than to 
correctly labeled forecasts of others. Because the incorrectly labeled forecasts were 
completely new to decision makers, they could not have served as anchors; instead they 
could have served as the foundations of egocentric forecasts.  
Several variables in the advice taking context have been found to moderate the 
egocentric discounting effect. These factors pertain to characteristics of the advisor (who 
advises it), characteristics of the advice (what is advised and how it is advised), 
characteristics of the decision maker (to whom it is advised), and characteristics of the 
problem for which the advice is sought (about what it is advised). 
 
Advisor characteristics: who advises it? 
Advice stemming from an expert has been found to be more influential than 
advice stemming from a novice (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Jungermann & Fischer, 
1997). When advisors possess greater task-relevant expertise and knowledge than the 
decision maker, they have what has been called ‘expert power’ (French & Raven, 1959). 
As a consequence, decision makers engage in less egocentric discounting when receiving 
expert advice (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004). Moreover, it 
appears than expert advice is perceived as more helpful and less intrusive than novice 
advice (Goldsmith & Fitsch, 1997). If the advice stems from an advisor who has a good 
reputation, decision makers also discount advice less egocentrically (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 
2000). According to Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) advisor reputations are formed quickly, 
on the basis of a small number of encounters, and sometimes even when feedback is 
absent. Note that many social and professional situations are characterized by a short 
window of opportunity during which an advisor can thus rapidly gain or lose a good 
reputation. In addition to the results from the above-mentioned studies, where expertise 
was conceptualized as task-relevant expertise, decision makers have also been found to 
take more advice from advisors who are older, better educated, have more life experience, 
and are wiser than themselves (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006). An advisor who is particularly 
confident about the recommendation he makes has also been found to be more influential 
(Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2004). Decision makers use their 
advisor´s confidence as a cue to infer advisor expertise or accuracy of the advice (ibid). 
Decision makers have even been found to prefer overconfident advisors to properly 
confident advisors (Price & Stone, 2004). Note, however, that higher confidence ratings do 
not always correlate with better advice quality (Philips, 1999). 
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Apart from advisor expertise, advisor confidence, and related advisor 
characteristics that affect advice taking, less egocentric discounting also occurs if the 
advisor makes a decision for himself in a manner similar to his advice to the decision 
maker (Schotter, 2003). Also, Gino, Sheng and Croson (2008) found that, when judging 
other’s actions (i.e. “Among people who donate money to an organ donation organization, 
what do you think is the average contribution per month?”), advice received from an 
advisor who was different from the decision maker in terms of demographic variables such 
as gender, age and race, was used more than advice from an advisor who was similar to the 
decision maker. In contrast, when judging one’s own actions (i.e. “In the past year, how 
much money did you donate per month to organ donation organizations?”), advice from 
the similar advisor was used more. According to these authors, different and similar 
advisors can offer advice that is more or less informative to decision makers dependent on 
whether there is a match with the object of evaluation: a different person (vs. different 
advisor), or the decision maker himself (vs. similar advisor). 
We can also make a link here to the compliance and social influence literature. 
Studies in this domain have found that likeability of an advisor increases compliance 
(Cialdini, 2001; Heider, 1958). There is a bounty of studies about the increased likelihood 
of complying with a request if the decision maker likes the person making it (Cialdini, 
2001). Especially physical attractiveness, that robustly predicts liking, has been found to 
positively affect compliance across a variety of domains (Lynn & Simons, 2000; McCall, 
1997). And even incidental similarities, such as having the same first name or having the 
same birthday have been found to increase compliance through increased liking (Burger, 
Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004). Perhaps superfluous, I would like to stress 
again that compliance, while related, is not the same as advice taking. But whereas the 
bulk of papers about the influence of advisor characteristics on advice taking focused on 
what can be explained as rational reasons for increased receptivity to advice, social 
influence theory inspired us to study the influence of a characteristic that could not be 
explained by rationality (alone). Chapter 2 reports seven experimental studies about the 
effect of advisor wealth on advice taking. We study the effect that advisor wealth has on 
advice taking across different consumption and investment situations. In the first two 
studies we use a visual manipulation of wealth, and in later studies we manipulate wealth 
by means of a scenario. Using this scenario, we were able to ‘strip’ advisor wealth from 
any inferences that could be made about built up expertise, knowledge, or life experience 
(i.e., what would be considered rational reasons to show less egocentric discounting). We 
also propose an underlying mechanism for the effect we find that goes beyond the obvious 
and rational ‘expertise’ explanation.  
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Advice characteristics: what is advised and how? 
 Next to characteristics of the person offering the advice, characteristics of the 
advice message itself also determine the extent to which a decision-maker is likely to 
discount the advice. In general, and not very surprisingly, decision makers discount poor 
advice more than good advice (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2008), 
but they may also discount good advice heavily (Gardner & Berry, 1995; Lim & 
O´Connor, 1995). It is not always easy for a decision maker to determine the quality of a 
piece of advice, and inferences of advice quality may not always be correct (Yates, Price, 
Lee, & Ramirez, 1996). Harries, Yaniv and Harvey (2004) moreover found that judges 
tend to discount outlying advice, advice that is thus very different from that of other 
advisors. Hence, decision makers appear to suppose that consensus-based advice has a 
higher likelihood of being accurate than extreme advice. 
 Besides what is advised, it also appears to be important how something is advised, 
although this has not been explicitly linked to advice taking in the literature. From classic 
studies on preference forming and decision making we learn that decision makers may fall 
prey to a framing effect bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). A framing effect occurs when 
two “logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements of a problem lead 
decision makers to choose different options” (Rabin, 1998 p. 38; emphasis in original). 
Framing effects have been documented extensively using a variety of respondents and 
comprising an impressive number of political, social and economic issues (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). So 
dependent on how a piece of advice is framed, for example, “I advise you to pick option A, 
I think it has a 55% of becoming a success” versus “I advise you to pick option A, but I 
think it has a 45% chance of not becoming a success”, it will probably be discounted 
differently by a decision maker. Advice from a credible source has been found to help 
overcome framing effects (Druckman, 2001). 
 Apart from what we know about framing effects and about how decision makers 
make inferences about the quality of a piece of advice, we know very little about other 
advice characteristics that may play a role in determining the extent to which advice is 
discounted. I believe this is due to the way that a typical advice taking experiment is 
designed. In the prototypical advice study, advice is offered in the form of a number (i.e. “I 
think person A weighs 65 kilos”; “I think there are 45 squares in this screen”) or in the 
form of a discrete choice option (i.e. “Choose option A”). A few studies have also added 
an expression of confidence (i.e. “Choose Option A—I am 75% sure that it is the best 
option”). Such an approach of course allows for solid quantification of the extent to which 
advice is utilized, but in real life most advice is not in the form of a number only, or in the 
form of a recommendation for one option only, without the advisor providing an 
explanation for it. Research to date has not investigated the influence of an advisor´s 
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justification for a particular piece of advice on subsequent advice utilization. In Chapter 3 
we make a first attempt in studying this, by looking at the effect that an extension of the 
very same qualitative advice with an intuitive justification or an analytic justification has 
on advice taking. We report three experiments, in which we also systematically vary the 
seniority of the advisor vis-à-vis the decision maker and study the interactions on two 
different types of marketing task. 
 
Decision maker characteristics: to whom is it advised? 
 It almost goes without saying that the extent to which advice is discounted is also 
greatly dependent on characteristics of the decision maker. Decision makers engage in less 
egocentric discounting if they are not as experienced or knowledgeable as their advisor 
(Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004) and/or relative to other decision 
makers (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). If a decision 
maker solicits the advice himself, instead of it being offered to him without a request, then 
the likelihood of advice utilization is also higher (Gibbons, Sniezek, & Dalal, 2003). 
Moreover, decision makers´ individual differences in autonomy have been found to 
influence advice acceptance from experts (Koestner, Gingras, Abutaa, Losier, DiDio, & 
Gagné, 1999). If decision makers trust their advisor, and believe that their incentives are 
aligned, advice taking will also be positively affected (Jungermann, 1999; Jungermann & 
Fischer, 2005; Sniezek, Heath, Van Swol, & Nochimowski, 1998). If decision makers have 
´reward power´ over their advisor in the sense that they can allocate a financial incentive to 
this advisor, advice discounting appears to be less pronounced (Sniezek & Van Swol, 
2001). This has also been found to hold if decision makers allocate the financial incentive 
up-front and thus pre-pay for (expert) advice (Gino, 2008; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 
2004). Gino (2008) moreover found that this even holds if the advice is of poor quality, 
and argues that his is probably due to commitment to a ´sunk cost´—a cost that has already 
been incurred and cannot be recovered.  
Moreover, stable individual traits of a decision maker, including demographic and 
personality characteristics, are known to affect perception and behavior in social situations 
(for a review see Burleson & MacGeorge, 2002) and it seems warranted to assume that 
such factors also have an influence on advice taking. Transient individual traits of a 
decision maker, including moods and emotions, have been found to affect individual 
decision making in general (for a review see Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003), but have 
until recently not been studied in an advice taking paradigm where a social element comes 
into play. Gino and Schweitzer (2008) were the first to study the influence of emotions on 
advice taking. In particular, they found that incidental emotions—emotions that were not 
related to the decision task at hand—had a significant influence on advice taking. Decision 
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makers that experienced incidental gratitude took more advice than decision makers in a 
neutral emotional state, whereas decision makers that experienced incidental anger took 
less advice than people in a neutral emotional state. Because many more emotions are 
often experienced by decision makers, that can positive or negative, self-focused (such as 
pride and shame) or other-focused (such as gratitude and anger), and relevant or irrelevant 
to the decision task at hand, Chapter 4 is devoted to developing a more thorough 
understanding of the role that discrete emotions experienced by a decision maker play in 
advice taking. 
 
Problem characteristics: about what is it advised? 
 Sniezek, Schrah and Dalal (2006) found that decision makers agreed more with 
advice as task complexity increased. Gino and Moore (2007) also studied the effect of task 
difficulty on advice taking and found that decision makers underweigh advice on easy 
tasks and overweigh advice on complex tasks. This is likely to occur because decision 
makers believe themselves to be better than others on simple tasks, but worse than others 
at difficult tasks (Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003). Besides the effects that have been 
found for problem complexity, no research to date has systematically investigated other 
problem characteristics that could result in more or less advice taking. I believe this is due 
to the difficulty inherent in trying to study advice taking on two tasks that differ only on 
one dimension. When trying to change only one element in a task, you often and 
unintendedly end up changing other elements in the task with it, which makes it very 
difficult to make any argument of causality.  
 The studies reported throughout this dissertation concern specific marketing 
problems. The experiments in Chapter 2 are about consumer decision making, in which 
one consumer seeks advice from a salesperson, financial advisor or another consumer 
about different consumption and investment dilemmas. The experiments in Chapter 3 and 
4 are about managerial decision making, in which one manager seeks advice from another 
manager about specific marketing issues, such as a product go or no-go dilemma or a 
branding case. Note that such tasks are fairly different from most studies reported in the 
advice literature where people are asked to estimate the weight of another person or the 
year in which a specific event occurred. With the marketing tasks that I designed I hope to 
make the results of the studies reported in this dissertation more generalizable to a 
marketing setting—or to make them at least more lifelike to consumers and marketing 
practitioners.   
 
 
10 An Introduction to Advice Taking 
 
Overview of this dissertation 
 Sociologist and psychologist Harold Lasswell once wrote the famous words, “who 
says what in which channel to whom with what effect” (1948, p. 37), reminding 
communication theorists of the importance of the source, the context, the message and the 
recipient, on the outcome. The general findings of the advice taking literature exactly map 
onto this. Within a marketing context (or channel), the individual chapters of this 
dissertation will each touch upon one element in Lasswell´s model of communication and 
examine their effect on advice taking: aspects of the advisor (or source) in Chapter 2, 
aspects of the advice (or message) in Chapter 3, and aspects of the decision maker (or 
recipient) in Chapter 4. This structure is displayed in Figure 1.1. Please be advised that the 
individual chapters of this dissertation are based on stand-alone scientific papers about 
advice taking, and were not written as interconnected chapters of a book. Hence, you may 
find repetitive (theoretical) arguments across chapters, that were necessary for the theory 
development of the individual papers—and I also encourage the reader to appreciate them 
as such. In Chapter 5 I will summarize the general findings reported in these empirical 
chapters, outline both the general scientific and managerial relevance of this research, and 
offer suggestions for future research on advice taking.  
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Chapter 2  
The Effect of Advisor Wealth on Consumer Advice Taking1 
 
 
Important consumption decisions are rarely made by one person in isolation. For example, 
for such high-stakes choices as medical and financial investment decision making, 
consumers seek and use outside advice, for instance from friends (Kahn & Baron, 1995). 
In situations in which consumers consider more than one purchase alternative, a 
recommendation from another person may potentially reduce the effort required in making 
the final purchase decision (Shugan, 1980) as well as the uncertainty surrounding it 
(Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004). When the advisor is perceived to be highly credible 
(Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) or to have particular expertise in the decision context 
(Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Jungermann & Fischer, 2005), consumers will utilize more of 
the advice to form their final opinion.  
 Whereas credibility and topical expertise should be directly related to the quality 
of the advice, other factors that are less directly related to advice quality may also play a 
role. For example, professional advisors we speak to commonly believe that signs of 
wealth, such as expensive cars, watches, clothing, and jewelry, can also increase the extent 
to which their advice is followed. This should not be surprising as wealth can be a valid 
indicator of past performance and expertise in a relevant domain. Thus, careful thought 
about expertise might reasonably lead consumers to conclude that the “rich are right.” 
Careful thought about expertise, however, may not be the only effect of advisor wealth on 
advice taking. Recent findings suggest that consumers are also influenced by less 
elaborative processes. For example, consumer behavior is often influenced by subtle 
environmental cues (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). Fitzsimons and Bargh (2003) showed that 
participants primed with their mother tried harder to do well at a task than control 
participants; and Chartrand and Bargh (1999) found that participants who were 
unobtrusively imitated by a confederate liked the confederate more than participants who 
were not imitated. These findings suggest that advisor wealth may also have an effect on 
consumer advice taking that is not mediated by reasonable inferences about expertise. 
More specifically, we argue in this article that wealth also has a much less elaborative 
effect on advice taking that is mediated by perceptions of power only.  
  
                                                          
1 Based on Tzioti, Van Osselaer & Wierenga, 2010a. 
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Theoretical Background 
 
Advisor characteristics & advice taking 
The weight we allocate to a (any) specific piece of advice is heavily dependent on 
advisor characteristics (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Researchers have found that decision 
makers utilize more advice if the advisor has expertise that is task-relevant (Birnbaum & 
Stegner, 1979; Jungermann & Fischer, 2005), if the advisor has a good reputation (Yaniv 
& Kleinberger, 2000) and if the advisor is confident (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Van Swol 
& Sniezek, 2005). Having a prior (trust) relationship with an advisor could influence 
advice acceptance as well (Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
Moreover, even though expertise has typically been construed as task-relevant expertise, 
decision makers also appear to be more responsive to advice from those who are older, 
better educated, have more life experience and more wisdom than themselves (Feng & 
MacGeorge, 2006). In addition, we like people who are similar to us (Cialdini & Trost, 
1998), and we are more inclined to comply with a request if we like the person making it 
(Cialdini, 2001). We are also more likely to comply if our advisor is physically attractive 
(Chaiken, 1979). Even though the body of research on advice taking is sizable and 
growing, to the best of our knowledge no research to date has investigated the influence of 
advisor wealth on advice taking. 
 
Advisor wealth 
Although we are not aware of any research in this area, anecdotal evidence 
suggests advisors believe that signaling wealth is an important determinant of advice 
taking. For example, consultants we talked to about factors that might influence advice 
taking frequently commented on the need to drive a “presentable” car and to wear 
expensive watches, suits, and jewelry. These anecdotal but widespread comments suggest 
that advisor wealth may increase consumers’ likelihood to follow advice. Such an effect 
would not be surprising or go counter common sense if it is based on reasonable, wealth-
based inferences about advisor expertise. Consumers have been argued to behave 
somewhat like information economists, interpreting rational signals of product quality 
(Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Rao, Qu, & Ruekert, 1999). Advisor wealth may be such an 
objectively informative signal, as wealth is likely to be correlated with factors such as 
expertise that enable advisors to give better advice. Thus, it is possible that any positive 
effect of advisor wealth on advice taking is driven by a sensible, deliberative process in 
which wealth is used appropriately as a signal to infer high-quality advice. 
However, it is possible that wealth has an effect beyond this commonsensical 
process. That is, advisor wealth may also increase advice taking when there is no obvious 
positive relationship with expertise, perhaps through a much less deliberative process. 
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People can have different evaluations of money (some may see it as evil, shameful, useless 
and dishonest), but most of us will have built up very positive associations with wealth as 
we progress through childhood (Mitchell & Mickel, 1999). We consciously or 
unconsciously see money as good, important, valuable and attractive (Tang, 1992). More 
specifically, we may associate wealth with power. In most Western cultures, wealth can 
substitute for social popularity (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009) and enables people to 
manipulate the social system to give them what they want (Lea & Webley, 2006). Wealthy 
people are not dependent on external circumstances and are free from constraints (Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Thus, in the sense that money offers 
control and access to resources, having money means having power (Mitchell & Mickel, 
1999). It is possible that this association with power drives a positive effect of advisor 
wealth on advice taking that goes beyond objectively-justified and deliberative inferences 
of expertise.  
 
Power & advice taking 
Power has been recognized as a central motivating force in human relationships 
and action (Keltner et al., 2003) and its importance as a construct has been widely 
acknowledged. It is a force that is present in most social interactions (Rucker & Galinsky, 
2008) and people tend to prefer being more rather than less powerful (Handgraaf et al., 
2008). When people have power, they often have increased capacity to influence others 
(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). However, with the exception of the work by Sniezek and 
Van Swol (2001) and Van Swol and Sniezek (2005), no prior research has investigated the 
relationship between power of the source and advice taking. In general, the research by 
Sniezek and Van Swol indicates that advice is utilized more when decision makers 
themselves, instead of advisors, hold power. In these studies, furthermore, power was 
integral to the task, whereas we are interested in the incidental effect of power. 
Broadening our theoretical scope, to the best of our knowledge, very few studies 
have examined the relationship between power of the source and persuasion in general. 
Recently, Briñol et al. (2007) found that when people feel powerless prior to a message 
(e.g., because the source is powerful), they process the message more and attitudes are 
affected by the thoughts generated. Classic work by Festinger and Thibaut (1951) and 
French and Raven (1959) found that powerful sources produced more attitude change and 
persuasion than powerless sources. Thus, it seems possible that a positive effect of advisor 
wealth on advice taking is mediated by advisor power.  
 
We tested the influence that advisor wealth has on advice taking, and moreover, 
by what process this happens, over a series of seven experiments in which we let 
participants make consumption, investment and purchase decisions.  
 
16 The Effect of Advisor Wealth on Consumer Advice Taking 
 
Experiment 1 
 
The first experiment was designed to find out whether consumers would take 
more advice from a salesperson who wears a nice suit and owns an expensive car as 
opposed to a salesperson who wears jeans and owns an average-priced car. The study 
concerned a two-cell (Advisor Wealth: rich vs. not rich) between-participants design in 
which participants had to make a choice between two different types of wine for 
consumption. 
 
Method  
Participants were told that an international wine house was in the process of 
developing a new blend of white wine. The wine house was supposedly considering to 
market one of two new blends of white wine: wine with a Greek twist and wine with a 
Turkish twist, that both contained a special national ingredient: masticha (of Greece) and 
raki (of Turkey). The wine house was allegedly interested in finding out which of the two 
wines would appeal most to students. Participants were told that they would get a sample 
bottle of their preferred wine to take home at the end of the study. 
In order to make a choice for one of the wines participants were give background 
information about the origin, composition, and taste of the special ingredients. Moreover, 
they were presented with advice about which wine would taste best that was offered by 
one the salespeople of the wine company. The salesperson was introduced to participants 
by means of a picture. In the rich advisor condition, the representative in the picture was 
dressed in a suit and was standing next to his Maserati Quattroporte. In the non-rich 
advisor condition, the same representative was dressed in jeans and was standing next to 
his Volkswagen Golf. It was stressed to participants that the representative had no 
incentive to persuade them to pick one wine variety over the other, but merely gave his 
opinion about which wine he thought would taste best. The salesperson offered the 
following advice: 
 
“If I were you, I’d definitely prefer white wine with a Greek (Turkish) twist. The 
described masticha (raki) taste seems to fit better with the original taste of a white wine” 
 
Which of the two wines was advised was determined at random. After receiving 
the advice, participants were asked to indicate a preference for one of the wines on a slide 
bar anchored 100% wine with a Greek twist on the left and 100% wine with a Turkish 
twist on the right that corresponded to 0 and 100 respectively on an underlying choice 
continuum. Subsequently, participants were asked to make a discrete choice and pick one 
of two bottles of wine to take home.  
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Results 
Thirty-four business students at a European university (20 female) participated in 
return for extra course credit. (The same population was used in Experiments 2 – 7.) We 
found a significant main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, F(1, 32) = 4.548, p = 
.03. Decision makers’ preference for one of the wines was more in line with the advice 
from a rich advisor (M = .73, SD = .27) than with the advice from a non-rich advisor (M = 
.53, SD = .28). Moreover, participants in the rich advisor condition more frequently choose 
the wine that was advised by the salesperson (76%) than participants in the non-rich 
advisor condition (47%), χ2 (33, N = 34) = 3.114, p = .04.  
 
Discussion 
In the first experiment we had participants evaluate a piece of advice from a rich 
versus a non-rich salesperson, using ‘power dressing’ and an expensive car to cue advisor 
wealth. Valid criticism on the approach we used in this experiment is that we did not have 
a pre-advice measurement of preference. Indeed, decision makers´ pre-advice preference 
can serve as a reliable baseline for evaluating advice taking (Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005; 
also see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Moreover, we can yet only speculate about the 
underlying process that causes decision makers to utilize more advice from a wealthy as 
opposed to a non-wealthy advisor. In order to find out whether our main effect is indeed 
mediated by perceptions of both expertise and power, we set up Experiment 2. In this 
experiment we will have a pre-advice preference measure and study financial advice 
taking. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
The second experiment concerned a two-cell (Advisor Wealth: rich vs. not rich) 
between-participants design in which participants had to invest their money in a mix 
between stocks and bonds. 
 
Method 
Participants (N = 43, 20 female) were asked to imagine having 15.000 Euros 
worth of savings that they would want to invest in stocks and/or bonds. They were asked to 
think about their preferred investment mix and could then indicate their decision on a slide 
bar anchored 100% stocks on the left and 100% bonds on the right that corresponded to 0 
and 100 respectively on an underlying choice continuum. After indicating their preferred 
investment mix, participants were asked to imagine seeking advice from a financial 
advisor because they were not really sure about their decision. Again, the advisor was 
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introduced by means of a picture. We used the same pictures as in Experiment 1 where the 
wealthy advisor was dressed in a suit standing next to his Maserati Quattroporte and the 
non-wealthy advisor was dressed in jeans standing next to his Volkswagen Golf. The 
financial advisor would subsequently advise to invest “most, perhaps all” of the money in 
stocks or bonds. Only one of the options was advised, stocks or bonds,— determined at 
random. After receiving the advice, participants were asked to indicate their final preferred 
investment mix to their bank. 
To find out whether perceived expertise and perceived power mediate the effect 
of advisor wealth on advice taking, we administered different scales. To capture perceived 
expertise we used Swasy’s (1979) ‘expert power’ scale consisting of eight items that 
capture the respondents’ attribution of superior skills or knowledge to their advisor. The 
items we used can be found in Appendix A. In order to capture perceived power, we 
designed a scale consisting of four items: How mighty do you perceive your advisor to 
be?; How powerful do you perceive your advisor to be?; To what extent do you believe 
that your advisor controls his environment?; To what extent do you believe that your 
advisor gets what he wants?  Respondents answered on a 5-point Likert-scale anchored 
“not at all” (1) and “very” (5). The scale has a Cronbach Alpha of .78. Moreover, to rule 
out the explanation that the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking would be due to 
increased feelings of trust in the advisor, we administered a 10-item trust inventory 
(adapted from Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). The trust inventory measures expectations of 
trustworthiness and intentions to trust another person. We listed the items we used in the 
Appendix B. All scales were administered after measuring the dependent variable. 
 
To capture the extent to which the advice is utilized, we use an advice taking 
measure introduced by Harvey and Fischer (1997). This measure takes the ratio of the 
difference between the decision maker’s final and initial response and the difference 
between the advisor’s recommendation and the decision maker´s initial response. In our 
case, dependent on the advised investment option, we calculated the dependent variable as, 
 if investing in stocks was the advised option; 
and as,   if investing in bonds was the advised 
option. This approach to measuring advice taking has been used in many other studies 
(Gino & Moore, 2007; Gino, Shang, & Croson, 2009; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 
2004). The formula essentially weighs the extent to which the decision maker’s final 
response is a function of his own response versus the advisor’s recommendation and it thus 
reflects how much the advice is utilized. If the decision maker´s final preferred investment 
mix is the same as the initially preferred mix, then the advice is ignored and Advice taking 
= 0. If the decision maker´s final preferred investment mix is the same as the advised 
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investment mix, then Advice taking = 1. All values between 0 and 1 reflect a weighting of 
the decision maker´s initial mix and the advice on the final mix. 
The formula yields an undefined value if the advice is the same as the decision 
maker´s initial response. In the second experiment we had one such case; following 
previous studies (Gino & Moore 2007; Gino, Shang, & Croson, 2009; Yaniv, 2004) we 
dropped this case from our analysis. We did the same for the two participants with 
undefined values in the third, 12 participants in the fourth, seven participants in the fifth, 
13 participants in the sixth, and zero participants in the seventh experiment. Moreover, 
negative values indicate a participant moving away from the advised decision. Following 
previous research (Gino & Moore 2007; Gino, Shang, & Croson, 2009; Yaniv, 2004) we 
included negative responses in our analyses. (Our analyses yield the same results if we 
would drop negative responses.) 
 
Results 
We again found a significant main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, 
F(1,41) = 6.662, p < .01. Decision makers took more advice from a rich advisor (M = .34, 
SD = .29) than from a non-rich advisor (M = .11, SD = .30). Moreover, two t-tests revealed 
that the rich advisor was perceived to have more expertise (M = 3.40, SD = .48) than the 
non-rich advisor (M = 2.91, SD = 1), t(42) = -2.033, p < .05, and was moreover perceived 
to have more power (M =3.68, SD = .52)  than his non-rich counterpart (M = 2.86, SD = 
.84), t(42) = -3.873, p < .001. We found no significant difference in perceived 
trustworthiness between both conditions (Mrich = 3.01 and Mnot rich = 3.18; t < 1). We tested 
whether perceived expertise and perceived power mediate the effect of Advisor Wealth on 
Advice taking following the guidelines by Baron and Kenny (1989). We tested the two 
mediators separately instead of simultaneously, because perceived expertise and power 
were strongly correlated here, r (44) = .74, p < .001. 
 
 
Figure 2.1   Mediation by Perceived Expertise and Power in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
β = .374, p < .01 
 
Advisor Wealth 
β = .492, p < .001 β = .299, p < .05 
β = .247, p = .09 
β = .557, p < .001 β = .513, p < .001 
β = .120, p = .43 
 
Perceived Expertise 
 
Perceived Power 
 
Advice Taking 
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Perceived expertise. A first equation regressed the dependent variable (Advice 
taking) on the independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This revealed a significant effect, B 
= .374, t(41) = 2.581, p < .01. A second equation regressed the mediator (Perceived 
Expertise) on the independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This also revealed a significant 
effect, B = .299, t(41) = 2.033, p < .05. A third equation regressed the dependent variable 
(Advice taking) on the mediator (Perceived Expertise) and the independent variable 
(Advisor Wealth). This analysis revealed a significant effect of Perceived Expertise on 
Advice taking, B = .417, t(40) = 2.999, p < .01, whereas the effect of Advisor Wealth on 
Advice taking was no longer significant, B = .247, t(40) = 1.777. A Sobel test confirmed 
that Perceived Expertise mediated the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, z = 
1.627, p = .05. 
 
Perceived power. A first equation regressed the dependent variable (Advice 
taking) on the independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This revealed a significant effect, B 
= .374, t(41) = 2.518, p < .01. A second equation regressed the mediator (Perceived Power) 
on the independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This also revealed a significant effect, B = 
.513, t(41) = 3.873, p < .001. A third equation regressed the dependent variable (Advice 
taking) on the mediator (Perceived Power) and the independent variable (Advisor Wealth). 
This analysis revealed a significant effect of Perceived Power on Advice taking, B = .496, 
t(40) = 3.265, p < .001, whereas the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking was no 
longer significant, B = .120, t(40) = .788. A Sobel test confirmed that Perceived Power 
mediated the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, z = 2.436, p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
 In the second experiment we had participants evaluate a piece of advice from a 
rich versus a non-rich salesperson, using a pre- and post-advice measurement and a picture 
manipulation to cue advisor wealth. As in the first experiment, we found that consumers 
were more susceptible to the advice of a wealthy advisor than to the advice of a non-
wealthy advisor. Moreover, we found that this effect is mediated by perceptions of advisor 
expertise and power. To find out whether the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking can 
also be driven by mere perceptions of power alone, we set up Experiment 3. In Experiment 
3 we use a scenario to introduce the advisor by means of which we disentangle wealth 
from achievement and in turn, perceptions of expertise, to isolate the mere effect of having 
an abundance of money on consumers´ susceptibility to take advice. 
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Experiment 3 
 
The third experiment was designed to find out whether consumers would take 
more advice from a rich acquaintance who just won the lottery as opposed to an 
acquaintance who is not rich. The scenario-based study concerned a two-cell (Advisor 
Wealth: rich vs. not rich) between-participants design in which participants had to invest 
their money in a mix between stocks and bonds. 
 
Method 
We use the same procedure as in Experiment 2 asking 104 respondents (64 
female) to indicate their preferred investment mix, both before and after receiving advice 
from a (rich or non-rich) advisor. In this study the advice came from an acquaintance who 
was either an ‘ordinary’ person earning a gross salary of 30.000 Euros a year or a rich 
person who won the lottery two months ago and now lives a luxurious life, but would 
otherwise have earned a gross salary of 30.000 Euros a year. Thus, there was no clear 
reason to infer that the wealthy advisor had more expertise than the non-wealthy advisor 
here. The exact description of the wealthy advisor read: 
 
“Your acquaintance is not just the average guy next door, he is a wealthy man. 
He lives in an expensive villa in Monaco. He has dinner in 3-star restaurants and also has 
a personal chef to prepare meals for him at home. He wears expensive tailored designer 
suits and drives a €300.000 Ferrari. On some days, he spends more money in one 
afternoon than some of us earn in three months. Can you picture it? 
Your acquaintance is this rich because he won the lottery 2 months ago. Before 
that he earned a gross salary of €30.000 per year.” 
 
Results 
We again found a significant main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, 
F(1, 100) = 4.806, p = .02. Decision makers took more advice from an advisor who just 
won the lottery (M = .20, SD = .31) than from an advisor who did not (M = .08, SD = .25).  
 
Posttest  
To explore the process underlying the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking, 
we carried out a posttest. In the posttest we showed the scenarios for both advisors to new 
respondents and asked them whether they felt that the rich acquaintance would be a better, 
equally good, or poorer advisor than the non-rich acquaintance when it comes to deciding 
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how to invest your money. Respondents answered on a nine-point Likert scale, where five 
was the middle point (indifference between both advisors).  
Fifty-eight students drawn from the same population as those in the original 
experiment answered this question. The mean response was 5.03 (SD = 1.18), implying 
that on average both acquaintances were perceived as equally good advisors by the 
students. To put it differently, participants seemed to acknowledge that advisor wealth is 
actually a superfluous variable here that offers no valid cue of advisor expertise/quality. 
 
Discussion 
Again, we had respondents evaluate advice from an advisor who was rich or from 
an advisor who was not rich. The rich advisor in this scenario study became wealthy by 
winning a lottery and would otherwise have earned the same salary as the non-rich advisor. 
The wealthy advisor did not earn his money by being a successful entrepreneur or investor 
(i.e. by achievement), which could have gained him actual expertise about investing 
money wisely. Instead, he was merely lucky in the game. This won him money, but not 
financial expertise. Whereas decision makers do seem to acknowledge this, judging from 
the results of the posttest, it is at odds with their behavior as they take more advice from 
the rich acquaintance than from the non-rich acquaintance.  
Although the posttest seems inconsistent with inferences that the lottery winner 
would be a better advisor than his less fortunate counterpart, it is possible that participants 
interpreted “advisor quality” as including an advisor tendency to get lucky. Investing your 
money in the stock market is in essence a monetary gamble for which luck is required. In 
Experiment 4, we explored the reliability of the wealth effect on advice taking in a context 
where luck should logically not have an effect on the decision outcome (and in which 
expertise seemed even less viable as an explanation for the effect).  
 
Experiment 4 
 
Experiment 4 employed a two-cell (Advisor Wealth: rich vs. not rich) between-
participants design in which participants had to choose between two different prepaid 
mobile phone packages. 
 
Method 
 Pretest. To further address explanations in terms of expertise, we sought to 
design a task where the rich advisor is considered to have less expertise about than the 
non-rich advisor. To this end, we generated a number of everyday activities and had 
participants in a pretest answer who they felt was the best advisor about these activities on 
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a 10-point Likert scale with end points ´someone who won the lottery two months ago and 
is now rich´ and ´someone who is not rich´. Hence, an average response of above 5 would 
indicate that the ordinary advisor is perceived as the better advisor than the rich advisor 
and vice versa. Although luck probably plays a role in almost any choice outcome, we also 
made sure to exclude financial activities with an obvious gambling bet. The activities and 
mean responses are shown in the Table 2.1. 
   
 
Table 2.1   Perceived advisor quality ratings 
Note. Responses were given on a 10-point Likert scale. Values above five indicate that the non-rich advisor is 
perceived to be a better advisor than the rich advisor.  
 
  
 For all types of task, respondents (N = 59) considered the non-rich advisor to be 
the better advisor (i.e. all averages were above five, the lowest mean was 6.03). We picked 
the prepaid mobile phone service task (M = 6.93, SD = 1.90), t(58) = 7.805, p < .001, for 
the main experiment, because we felt that choosing between two prepaid mobile phone 
providers would be very lifelike and relatively important to our student participants. 
  
Procedure.  Participants (N = 167, 75 female) were asked to imagine they were 
deciding on a new prepaid mobile phone provider. They were offered different deals by 
two fictitious providers, MyPrepay and Prepay4U. Both providers offered the same phone, 
but differed slightly on costs per call and text message, base tariff, network coverage and 
overall package price. Participants then indicated their preference for one provider over the 
other on a slide bar anchored 100% MyPrepay on the left and 100% Prepay4U on the right 
that corresponded to 0 and 100 respectively on an underlying choice continuum.  
After indicating their initial provider preference, participants were asked to 
imagine seeking advice from an acquaintance because they were not really sure about their 
decision. This acquaintance was either an ‘ordinary’ person earning a gross salary of 
 M SD 
Gardening 6.03 1.60 
Repairing the car  6.63 1.55 
Selecting a value-for-money holiday destination  6.68 2.13 
Doing the laundry                                                                  6.81 1.79 
Selecting the best pre-pay mobile phone provider 6.93 1.90 
Cleaning the house 7.12 1.62 
Finding the best route to take with public transports  7.29 1.91 
Finding the best deals on the Internet 
 
7.46 1.79 
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30.000 Euros a year or a rich person who won the lottery two months ago and now lives a 
luxurious life, but would otherwise have earned a gross salary of 30.000 Euros a year. We 
used the same scenario to introduce the rich acquaintance as we did in the first study. The 
acquaintance would subsequently advise to go for MyPrepay or Prepay4U, and would add, 
“Taking everything into account, they seem to offer the better deal”. Thus, one of the 
providers was recommended—determined at random. After receiving the advice, 
participants were asked to indicate their final preference for one of the two providers. 
To investigate the possibility of demand effects, respondents were given the 
opportunity to guess the purpose of the experiment at the end of the study. In addition, we 
asked them to explicitly elaborate on the extent to which they used the advice they 
received. 
 
Results 
We again found a significant main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, 
F(1,153) = 3.725, p = .03. Decision makers took more advice from an advisor who just 
won the lottery (M = .21, SD = .33) than from an advisor who did not (M = .12, SD = .27).  
None of the respondents indicated that they believed the purpose of the 
experiment was to investigate the influence of advisor wealth on advice utilization. Most 
respondents did indicate that they thought the experiment had something to do with 
another person’s influence on their decision making, but they never guessed the direction 
of the effect or mentioned anything about the influence of wealth. Moreover, in response to 
the question about the extent to which respondents utilized the advice, almost 40% of 
respondents in the rich advisor condition explicitly stated something about the lack of 
credibility of the rich acquaintance or that they did not value his opinion much. Only 10% 
of respondents in the non-rich advisor condition gave a similar response. We carried out 
comparable analyses to check for a possible demand effect in all further studies and never 
found any evidence or even a hint in that direction. 
 
Discussion 
We found that decision makers take more advice about which prepaid mobile 
phone package to choose from an advisor who has just won the lottery than from an 
advisor who did not. This effect occurred despite the fact that our participant population 
considers wealth to be a negative indicator of advisor quality in this context when 
differences in wealth are made salient to them. Together, Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that 
advisor wealth may have a positive effect on advice taking that goes beyond wealth’s 
potential function as an explicit signal of expertise.  
Valid criticism of the experiments we reported thus far concerns the 
informativeness of the advisor descriptions. Decision makers receiving the advice of the 
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rich acquaintance know a lot more about this person than decision makers receiving advice 
from the non-rich acquaintance: they know where he lives, where he eats, and what car he 
drives. This person is now much more vivid and, moreover, decision makers may get the 
feeling that they know him. This in turn may influence how much they trust the advisor, 
which has been shown to positively affect advice utilization (Jungermann & Fischer, 2005; 
Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Additionally, the timing of when the information that the rich 
advisor won his money in a lottery recently is presented may influence our results. Thus 
far, we first let respondents learn about the luxurious rich life of this acquaintance and 
afterwards inform them that he became rich not by achievement, but merely by being 
lucky. It is possible that participants paid insufficient attention to this last part of the 
scenario. Experiment 5 addresses these two concerns. In addition, we explore alternatives 
to the power explanation by measuring several constructs that could mediate (or perhaps 
also moderate) the effect. A first one would be arousal. It is conceivable that people would 
take more advice from the rich advisor simply because they would be more aroused after 
reading the description of the extraordinary life he is living. According to the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), high levels of arousal reduce the amount of 
processing capacity such that peripheral cues (e.g. advisor wealth) can have a stronger 
effect on attitudes. On the other hand, Pham (1996) has shown that under certain 
conditions, decision makers select for further processing those elements that are most 
diagnostic (and thus do not select the least diagnostic ones, e.g. advisor wealth). Second, 
specific perceived personality traits of the advisor could be thought to mediate or possibly 
moderate our main effect—it could be that participants take more advice from the rich 
acquaintance because they believe he is smarter, more thoughtful towards others, or 
selfless, for example. A last alternative explanation would be that participants simply like 
the rich person better. Cialdini (2001) found that we are more inclined to comply with a 
request if we like the person making it.  
 
Experiment 5 
 
Method 
We use the same procedure as in Experiment 4 asking 51 respondents (25 female) 
to indicate the extent to which they preferred one of two prepaid mobile phone packages, 
both before and after receiving advice from a (rich or non-rich) acquaintance. In order to 
make both advisor descriptions equally informative, we made a description for the non-
rich advisor in a similar manner as we did for the rich advisor:  
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“Your acquaintance is the average guy next door; he is not a wealthy man. He 
lives in a small apartment in Rotterdam. He likes to have dinner in a pizzeria, but usually 
prepares his meals at home. He wears WE and H&M suits and drives a €10.000 Renault. 
His spending behavior is average. Can you picture it? 
Your acquaintance earns a gross salary of €30.000 per year.” 
 
We kept the description for the rich advisor the same as in the first two studies. 
Nevertheless, we changed the sequence in which the salary/lottery information was 
presented. This was now presented first in both advisor descriptions. After the second 
preference measure, participants filled out a number of instruments measuring potential 
mediators or moderators. In addition, to further discard the argument that our results would 
be caused by a demand effect, we also asked respondents directly, ‘How much did you 
change your opinion based on the advice of your acquaintance?”. If our effect would be 
driven by demand, we would expect to find a significant difference between both 
experimental conditions on this question as well. 
 
Results 
We again found a significant main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, 
F(1,42) = 3.277, p = .04. Decision makers took more advice from an advisor who just won 
the lottery (M = .20, SD = .18) than from an advisor who did not (M = .12, SD = .13).   
Arousal. We used a (shortened) subscale (Shacham, 1983) of the Profile of Mood 
States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) to measure the extent to which 
respondents were aroused. After completing the mobile phones task, we asked respondents 
to indicate the extent to which they felt lively, active, energetic, cheerful, full of pep and 
vigorous (Cronbach alpha = .80). Respondents answered on a five-point scale ranging from 
“not at all” (1) to “extremely” (5). We took the average of all five items to calculate a 
single Arousal variable.  
We found no significant difference in Arousal between both conditions (Mrich = 3.20 
and Mnot rich = 3.21; t < 1). Arousal was however found to have a significant effect on 
Advice taking, t = 2.367, p = .03. Interestingly, the more participants were aroused, the less 
advice they took (B = -.066). In line with the reasoning of Pham (1996), more aroused 
participants may have discounted the advice more, because the advice that was given was 
in itself not very informative/diagnostic.  
Advisor traits. Based on the method used by Abelson et al. (1982) we asked 
respondents to characterize several traits of their advisor by asking questions in the 
following format, “How does the word smart describe your advisor?”. Respondents 
answered on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “extremely” (5). We picked 
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eight personality traits that we thought could be appropriate in this context, of which we 
formulated four as positive and four as negative character traits: smart, knowledgeable, 
hard-working, thoughtful towards others, selfless (selfish), honest (dishonest), reliable 
(unreliable), self-reliant (dependent). 
Participants perceived the rich advisor to be less hard-working (Mrich = 2.24 and Mnot 
rich = 3.13; t(43) = -3.374, p < .001) and less thoughtful towards others (Mrich  2.67 and Mnot 
rich = 3.22; t(43) = -2.212. < .01) than the ordinary advisor. We found no significant 
differences between conditions for the other six personality traits (ts < 1.5, all ps > 0.15).  
The only variable that had a significant influence on Advice taking was the extent to which 
respondents perceived their advisor to be smart (t(43) = 2.257, p = .03). The smarter 
respondents found their advisor, the more advice they took of him (B = .080). None of the 
other variables has a significant influence on Advice taking (ts < 1, all ps > .22). Moreover, 
no variable was found to moderate the relationship between Wealth of Advisor and Advice 
taking (ts < 1, all ps > .10). Importantly, the knowledgeability results further indicate that 
our effect is not due to inferences that the rich person has more expertise. 
 
Advisor liking. Inspired by a method designed by Tripp, Jensen and Carlson (1994) 
to measure likeability of a source, we asked respondents to indicate the extent to which 
they found their advisor: unlikeable/likable, unfriendly/friendly, unpleasant/pleasant, 
cold/warm, and unenjoyable/enjoyable (Cronbach Alpha = .78). Respondents could 
indicate their answer on a five-point scale. We took the average of all five items to 
calculate a single Advisor Liking variable. We found no significant difference in Advisor 
Liking between both conditions (Mrich = 3.50 and Mnot rich = 3.35; t < 1). Advisor Liking 
was also not found to have a significant influence on Advice taking (t < 1) or to moderate 
the relationship between Advisor Wealth on Advice taking (t < 1). 
Demand. As expected, we found no significant difference between conditions in 
responses to the question to what extent respondents changed their mind upon receiving 
the advice (Mrich = 3.65 and Mnot rich = 3.38; t(43) < 1). The difference between conditions is 
nevertheless in the expected direction, but insignificant. This offers support against the 
argument that the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking would be due to respondents 
trying to please the experimenters or trying to act in accordance with what they believe is 
expected from them. Also, it offers support for the argumentation that (part of) the 
observed behavior operates unconsciously.  
 
Discussion 
The results in Experiment 5 assuage concerns that the effect of Advisor Wealth on 
Advice taking would be due to information asymmetry in the advisor descriptions or 
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failing to notice, at the end of the description, that the advisor’s wealth was based on luck. 
We also showed that the effect was not mediated by increased arousal, perceptions of 
desirable personality traits of the advisor, or by increased liking of the advisor. Our main 
effect thus seems to be quite robust and unexplained by a number of candidate 
explanations. 
This leaves our hypothesis that the effect occurs because the rich advisor is seen 
to have power and that perceived power (alone) enhances advice taking. We designed 
Experiment 6 to investigate if power mediates the effect of advisor wealth on advice 
taking.  
Experiment 6 
 
Method 
We used a two-cell (Advisor Wealth: rich vs. not rich) between-participants 
design in which participants had to choose between two different prepaid mobile phone 
packages and in which we measured perceived power of the advisor. Following the same 
procedure as in the previous two experiments, we asked 78 participants (21 female) to 
indicate the extent to which they preferred one of two prepaid mobile phone packages. To 
find out whether perceived power mediates the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking, 
we again administered our perceived power scale (see Experiment 2) after measuring the 
dependent variable. 
 
Results 
We again found a main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, F(1,64) = 
3.293, p = .04. Decision makers used more advice if their advisor was rich (M = .15, SD = 
.19) than if their advisor was not rich (M = .08, SD = .10). Moreover, a t-test revealed that 
the rich advisor (M = 3.07, SD = .75) was perceived to have more power than the ordinary 
advisor (M = 2.24, SD = .68), t(64) =-5.087, p < .001. We tested whether perceived power 
mediates the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking following the guidelines by Baron 
and Kenny (1989). 
 
A first equation regressed the dependent variable (Advice taking) on the 
independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This revealed a significant effect, B = .223, t(64) = 
1.815, p = .04. A second equation regressed the mediator (Perceived Power) on the 
independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This also revealed a significant effect, B = .504, 
t(64) = 5.087, p < .001. A third equation regressed the dependent variable (Advice taking) 
on the mediator (Perceived Power) and the independent variable (Advisor Wealth). This 
analysis revealed a significant effect of Perceived Power on Advice taking, B = .347, t(63) 
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= 2.376, p < .01, whereas the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking was no longer 
significant, B = .020, t(63) = .138. A Sobel test confirmed that Perceived Power mediated 
the effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, z = 2.168, p = .03. 
 
 
Figure 2.2   Mediation by Perceived Power in Experiment 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Follow-up Experiment 
 We hypothesized that the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking would be 
mediated by perceptions of advisor power through a simple mechanism based on 
associations between power and positive valence. However, it could also be that people 
actually want to mediate positive outcomes (rewards) or decrease negative outcomes 
(punishments) by taking advice from the more powerful (rich) advisor. Perhaps 
participants perceive power in a more social and interpersonal form and look upon the 
wealthy advisor as holding “reward” or “coercive” power over them (Swasy, 1979). 
Reward and coercive power are included in many commonly used definitions of power 
(Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Kipnis, 1972; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). Nevertheless, we 
should be mindful of the fact that our studies are scenario-based and that the acquaintance 
is a weak tie based in another country than the participant. Therefore, we do not expect 
participants to actually make inferences about power in such an interpersonal way that they 
strive for rewards from or fear repercussions of this person. In order to find empirical 
support for our claim, we carried out a follow-up experiment under 72 participants (24 
female) following the same procedure as in the original Experiment 6. To find out whether 
reward and/or coercive power mediate the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking, we 
administered Swasy´s (1979) corresponding social power scales. Moreover, to provide 
further evidence that this effect is also not mediated by inferred expertise of the wealthy 
advisor, we included Swasy´s expert power scale as well. All items can be found in 
Appendix A. The scales were administered after measuring the dependent variable. 
Main effect. We again found a main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, 
F(1,70) = 4.117, p = .03. Decision makers used more advice if their advisor was rich (M = 
.25, SD = .48) than if their advisor was not rich (M = .11, SD = .45). 
β = .233, p = .04 
β = .347, p < .01 β = .504, p < .001 
β = .020, p = .89 
 
Advisor Wealth 
 
Perceived Power 
 
Advice Taking 
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Power measures. Advisor Wealth had no significant effect on perceived Reward 
Power (Mrich = 2.00, SD = .74; Mnot rich = 2.17, SD = .77) or Coercive Power (Mrich = 1.42, 
SD = .57; Mnot rich = 1.53, SD = .62), ts < 1, all ps > .35. Advisor Wealth did have a 
significant effect on perceived Expert Power. Respondents assigned more expert power to 
the non-rich advisor (M = 2.59, SD = .67) than to the rich advisor (M = 2.17, SD = .84), 
t(70) = 2.343, p = .02. 
 
Discussion 
With this study we demonstrate that perceived power mediates the effect of 
advisor wealth on advice taking. In other words, a rich advisor is perceived to have more 
power, which in turn results in increased advice taking. Moreover, with the results of the 
follow-up experiment we show that the power that underlies the effect should not be 
interpreted as a more social and interpersonal form of power. In addition, we provide 
further evidence against an explanation in terms of expertise as we found that the wealthy 
advisor is perceived to have less (situation-specific) expertise than his ´ordinary´ 
counterpart. Hence, it appears as if advisor wealth indeed has an effect on advice taking 
that goes well beyond an explanation in terms of expertise inferences. To provide further 
evidence for the underlying mechanism of our main effect, we primed respondents with the 
concept of power in Experiment 7. Making the concept of power more accessible in 
memory should facilitate seeing wealth (consciously or unconsciously) in terms of power, 
strengthening the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking. 
 
Experiment 7 
 
Method 
Experiment 7 employed a 2 (Advisor Wealth: rich vs. not rich) x 2 (Prime: power 
vs. non-power) between-participants design in which participants had to choose between 
two different prepaid mobile phone packages (N = 82, 51 female). We again used the same 
procedure as in the previous three experiments, with the following exception. After 
indicating their first preference, allegedly because research has shown that consumers 
make better consumption decisions if they are distracted for a little while, we asked 
participants to continue with another, ostensibly unrelated task. We mentioned that we 
would get back to them about the mobile phone packages afterwards.  
The second task was supposedly meant to measure participants´ language ability. 
In reality, it was a scrambled sentences task (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) designed to prime 
the concept of power in the power prime conditions. Participants were instructed to make 
coherent, grammatical sentences out of 15 groups of five words. In the course of doing so, 
Chapter 2 31 
 
participants in the power prime condition were exposed to eight words that were chosen to 
prime the concept of power: mighty, supreme, dominated, controls, authority, executive 
and powerful. In the non-power prime condition participants were exposed to ´neutral´ 
words: early, clean, thanked, sees, person, dog and breathing. The filler sentences, as well 
as the other words in the word groups that included the target words, were the same in both 
conditions. The priming stimuli were chosen by consulting a standard thesaurus for close 
synonyms of power and directly related concepts. Upon debriefing, none of the 
participants was found to be aware of the purpose of the prime or the effect of the prime on 
their subsequent performance in the task. 
After completing the scrambled sentences task, we redirected participants to the 
mobile phones task and restated the provider offers. Next participants received their 
acquaintance’s advice and indicated their final preference.  
 
Results and discussion 
 We found a significant main effect of Advisor Wealth on Advice taking, 
F(1,78) = 8.170, p < .001. Decision makers took more advice from an advisor who just 
won the lottery (M = .38, SD = .48) than from an advisor who did not (M = .12, SD = .35).  
Moreover, we found a main effect of Prime on Advice taking, F(1,78) = 2.960, p = .04. 
Decision makers took more advice if they had been primed with power (M = .34, SD = .42) 
than if they had not been primed with power (M = .17, SD = .45).  
  
 
Figure 2.3   Interaction by Power in Experiment 7 
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Note. Cells with a different superscript differ significantly from each other (p < .01). 
 
More importantly, the main effects were qualified by an interaction effect of 
Advisor Wealth and Prime on Advice taking, F(1,78) = 2.720, p < .05. When primed with 
power, decision makers took significantly more advice from an advisor who is rich (M = 
.54, SD = 47) than from an advisor who is not rich (M = .12, SD = .18), F(1,78) = 9.905, p 
< .001. When primed with other, non-power, words we observe no significant difference in 
Advice taking dependent on Advisor Wealth (Mrich = .23, SD = .45; Mnot rich = .12, SD = 
.46), F < 1. 
In sum, consistent with the results in Experiment 6 and as hypothesized, we found 
that the effect of advisor wealth on advice taking was stronger when we primed the 
concept of than when we primed other concepts unrelated to power. This again suggests 
that advisor wealth has an effect on advice taking that does not depend on inferences about 
advisor expertise but is mediated by a seemingly more subtle effect of power.  
 
General Discussion 
 
When making consumption decisions people routinely seek advice from other 
persons. Advisor characteristics that have been found to influence the degree of advice 
taking are, amongst others, advisor expertise (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979, Jungermann & 
Fischer, 2005), advisor reputation (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), advisor confidence 
(Sniezek & Buckley, 1995, Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005) and the age, education, wisdom, 
and life experience of the advisor (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006). 
In this paper we investigated the influence of advisor wealth on advice taking. We 
hypothesized that decision makers would take more advice from rich advisors, even when 
wealth would not reflect expertise or past performance at similar tasks. Whereas careful 
deliberation about wealth as a signal of achievement may lead consumers to believe that 
the “rich are right”, we argued that wealth may also have an effect beyond this 
commonsensical process. Supported by anecdotal evidence that signaling wealth by means 
of driving expensive cars and power dressing would increase consumers´ likelihood to 
follow consultants ´advice, we hypothesized that the effect of advisor wealth on advice 
taking (beyond expertise) would be mediated by perceptions of advisor power. Although 
  Rich Not rich 
Power M  .54a  .12b 
 SD  .48  .18 
Non-power M  .23b  .12b 
 SD  .44  .46 
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we have no direct evidence, we speculated that this effect is a relatively non-deliberative 
effect based on simple associations between wealth and power, and between power and 
positive valence.  Hence, wealth = power = good would be the fundamental process that 
we predicted to be operating here. 
In a series of seven experiments we asked decision makers to make a consumption 
decision, an investment decision, or to indicate a preference between two different prepaid 
mobile phone providers. In all studies, we found that decision makers are more susceptible 
to a rich advisor´s recommendation than to the recommendation of an ´ordinary´ advisor. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, where we used a picture manipulation, we found that this effect 
was driven by perception of expertise as well as power. In our five scenario studies, 
however,  we explicitly stated that the rich advisor was wealthy because he won the 
lottery—not because of expertise or past performance in the same or similar tasks. 
Moreover it is key to note that on the mobile phone task, within-participants, the rich 
advisor was actually perceived as a poorer advisor than the ordinary advisor. But when 
decision makers eventually got advice from the rich person, they utilized this person’s 
advice much more than they would have given credit for beforehand. The results of the 
sixth experiment offer support for a mediation of this effect by perceived power (alone) 
and offer additional support against the expertise explanation as participants rated the rich 
advisor lower on expert power than the non-rich advisor. Moreover, with the seventh study 
we demonstrate that the effect becomes stronger when power is made salient to decision 
makers.  
We believe our findings offer a whole new perspective to the research on advice 
taking. Whereas most previous research has found that specific cues lead to increased or 
decreased advice taking when this seems warranted, for example, we take more advice if 
our advisor has expertise and less advice if our advisor is not very confident about his 
advice—the present research finds that an incidental cue such as advisor wealth may have 
an impact on advice taking when this seems consciously unwarranted. The mere 
knowledge that an advisor has a lot of money on his bank account makes decision makers 
utilize his advice more than the advice from an advisor that is considered to have more 
task-relevant expertise. We find that this effect is robust and that it appears to be relatively 
automatic, perhaps even hard-wired. Accordingly, we do not only contribute to research on 
advice taking, but moreover to research on human cognitive processing and consumer 
decision making in general. 
We believe that our research may also have important practical implications. 
Various industries, from advertising to consulting, build their business on the ability to 
make the advice they provide to their consumers valued and utilized. Many people hold 
consultants in awe. They drive fancy cars, wear designer suits, and carry themselves with 
certain gravity. The shiny suit and luxury car signals wealth and makes the advisors appear 
more powerful. As companies spend millions hiring external consultants, one can only 
ponder whether the Armani suit and BMW really make consumers value consultants´ 
34 The Effect of Advisor Wealth on Consumer Advice Taking 
 
advice more. Our research suggests that merely looking the part may truly increase 
advisors´ success. From persuasion literature we already knew that physically attractive 
communicators produce more attitude change (Chaiken, 1979), but the anecdotal eye-
catching Rolex around the wrist, the classy Armani suit and the expensive BMW parked in 
front of the office actually do seem to contribute to increased advice taking as well. 
Future research could possibly point out whether the present results are persistent 
over time. Moreover, it would be interesting to see if the results can be replicated by 
varying the manner in which rich advisors obtained their wealth. Other ways of becoming 
rich without achievement are by marrying into money or receiving an inheritance. 
In summary, our findings suggest that the advice from wealthy advisors is more 
likely to be followed than advice from less wealthy advisors, even when they are not 
considered to have expertise, and that this effect is mediated by perceptions of advisor 
power. Perhaps there is something to the common saying “the rich are always right” after 
all.  
  
Chapter 3  
The Effect of Intuitive Advice Justification on Advice Taking2 
 
 
Wise men don’t need advice – fools don’t take it 
Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) 
 
Few marketing managers make important decisions in isolation. As a matter of fact, 
managerial decision making is becoming more and more consultative. Vroom and Jago 
(1988) identify five methods of managerial decision making, of which three are structured 
as a decision maker receiving advice and information from others but making the final 
decision alone. In marketing especially, seeking advice from a colleague or hiring an 
external consultant to give specific recommendations is common practice. But what is the 
effect of such advice on the marketer’s decision? What makes the decision maker change 
her mind in the direction of the advice? Until recently, little consideration was given to the 
use of advice in empirical studies about decision making. However, as research on advice 
grows, scholars are beginning to understand what causes specific advice messages to be 
utilized differently. This is dependent on what is recommended (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 
2000), by whom it is recommended (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Jungermann & Fischer, 
2005; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), how the recommendation 
is communicated (framing effects), to whom the recommendation is made (Harvey & 
Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), 
and about what the recommendation is made (Gino & Moore, 2007; Schrah, Dalal & 
Sniezek, 2006). 
This paper is on the justification of a recommendation. Apart from what we know 
about framing effects, we know very little about the influence of how a piece of advice is 
justified or motivated on subsequent advice utilization. In line with the dual-processes 
model of decision making that distinguishes two systems used in decision making, the 
intuitive system (or System 1) and the analytic system (or System 2) (Kahneman, 2003), 
advice can be justified by intuitive or analytic arguments. Particularly among academics 
                                                          
2 Based on Tzioti, Van Osselaer & Wierenga, 2010b. 
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there is a clear preference for an analytical approach to marketing problems (Kotler, 1971; 
Russo & Schoemaker, 2002). Intuition is seen as having a lower intellectual standing and 
can be a synonym for “sloppy thinking” (Hogarth, 2001, p. 4). And indeed, the advantages 
of using analytical models in marketing practice have been extensively documented (Lilien 
& Rangaswamy, 2008; Wierenga, Van  Bruggen, & Althuizen, 2008). However, recently a 
growing number of authors writes on the power of intuition in solving problems 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006; Hogarth, 2001; 
Wilson & Schooler, 1991) and they find that under certain conditions intuition outperforms 
analysis. In marketing, Blattberg & Hoch (1990) found that a combination of managerial 
intuition and analytical thinking performed better than an analytical model only.   
Thus far, the emphasis in empirical studies has been on the intuition of the 
decision maker. But what is the effect of the intuition of an advisor on the decision maker? 
Most likely, there is an a priori suspicion of intuition here also. Recommendations that are 
the result of analytic processes are more credible than suggestions based on vague 
hunches. However, are there situations where decision makers do follow intuitive advice, 
and if so, what characterizes such situations? No research to date has examined the extent 
to which managers are actually willing to rely on someone else’s intuition when making 
decisions. This research aims to contribute to our understanding in this area by looking at 
the effect of intuitive (vs. analytic) justifications for advice on advice taking. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
Advice taking in marketing 
Advice is typically sought for problems that are not well structured and for which 
there is no ‘universally correct’ answer. Many marketing problems fall into this category 
as they involve making decisions concerning products and services, advertising, 
promotion, buyer behavior and business strategy. For this reason, marketing decision 
makers often seek advice from others for the benefit of pooling intellectual skills and 
diversity of knowledge in order to make better decisions. Advice seeking in organizations 
can be captured by an organizational model in which an organizational member (a 
colleague) gives advice to another organizational member (the decision maker). 
Alternatively, it can be captured by a market model in which an external third party (a 
consultancy) is hired for giving advice to a marketing decision maker. 
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Advice taking & justification 
One of the most robust findings in the advice literature is the “egocentric 
discounting effect” (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Several studies found that decision 
makers do not follow their advisor’s recommendations nearly as much as they should to 
truly benefit from them. Instead, they overweigh their own opinion relative to that of their 
advisor and tend to shift a “token” amount – about 25% - toward their advisor’s opinion 
(Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Yaniv (2004) argues that this occurs because decision makers 
have access to their own underlying justifications and the strength of the arguments that 
support their decision. In contrast, they do not have access to their advisor’s web of 
thoughts and, as a consequence, have less access to evidence justifying the advisor’s 
decisions. This could imply that adding any justification for advice, either intuitive or 
analytical, would be beneficial to advice taking, because a decision maker will have more 
insight into the underlying justification for the given advice. This is consistent with 
Langer, Blank and Chanowitz (1978) who found that adding a reason to a request will 
increase compliance, even if the reason conveys no information. Alternatively, we might 
argue that adding a justification for advice allows for this very justification to be processed 
for accuracy by the decision maker, just like other cues in the advice taking context are 
processed to assess the quality of the advice (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Dependent on 
the extent to which a decision maker believes that the advisor´s intuition or analysis is 
good or bad, we might expect a differential effect based on type of advice justification. In 
order to determine in what direction we could expect such an effect we first need to look at 
the literature about the use of intuition in decision making. 
 
Intuition in decision making 
 A substantial body of traditional research suggests that the use of intuition in 
decision making is inferior to the use of analysis (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; 
Kahneman, 2003). Scholars of decision making have demonstrated that intuitive thinking 
is subject to all sorts of biases and flaws (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Bonabeau (2003)’s 
article in Harvard Business Review even carries ‘Don’t trust your gut’ as a telling title, 
claiming that intuition is unreliable and analytical tools should be applied instead. Clancy 
and Krieg (2007) speak from practical experience when they claim that managers 
erroneously believe that they have an innate ability to make good intuitive decisions. Using 
numerous examples these authors demonstrate how good analysis leads to legendary 
marketing strategies and how intuition repeatedly falls short. Also in marketing in 
particular, there are many success stories about the use of analytical decision aids 
(Wierenga & Van Bruggen, 2000; Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2004). In his famous marketing 
models book Philip Kotler (1971) wrote that he observed “the emergence of a new breed 
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of marketing men who are turning to more analytical approaches in response to the 
increasing pressure on management to tie sales to profits” (p. v).  
Even though in recent literature there has also been growing recognition of the 
value of intuition and the power of tacit knowledge, the idea that an analytical approach to 
decision making is more scientific and has a higher intellectual standing still seems to be 
more prevalent. Therefore, we may expect a difference between the persuasive effect of 
intuitive and analytic advice. If decision makers believe that advice justified by intuition is 
the outcome of mere sloppy thinking, they might not be willing to follow the advice. On 
the other hand, if they believe that advice justified by analysis is the outcome of solid fact-
based thinking, it might result in significant opinion change. Compared to a situation in 
which any justification for advice is absent, adding the analytic argument may then be 
beneficial to advice taking, whereas adding the intuitive argument is perhaps even 
detrimental. In order to get a first cut on the effect of an intuitive versus an analytic advice 
justification on advice taking we set up Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Design 
Experiment 1 is concerned with how advice justification affects advice taking. 
We study advice utilization in an organizational model, where one organizational member 
gives advice to another organizational member (the decision maker). We use a 3-cell 
(Advice Justification: by intuition, by analysis, no justification) between-participants 
design. 
 
Pre-test 
In order to ensure that the advice justifications we used in this study were actually 
perceived as being based on intuitive or analytic thinking we carried out a pre-test. In the 
pre-test, we gave respondents twelve different types of justifications, six intuitive ones and 
six analytic ones, and asked them to evaluate the extent to which they felt that each 
justification was the outcome of an intuitive process or the outcome of an analytical 
process. The response scale ranged from 0 (very intuitive) to 10 (very analytic) and the 
statements were given to each respondent in random order. Note that the content of the 
advice that followed the justification was the same for all twelve cases. Thus the only part 
that we changed for each case was the specific form of justification. 
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Table 3.1   Mean intuition/analysis ratings and standard deviations per justification type 
Intuitive justifications M SD Analytic justifications M SD 
My gut tells me 1.86 1.21 The market research data 
tell me 
7.92 1.58 
If I go with what my intuition 
says 
2.02 1.51 If I go with what the 
consumer data says 
6.88 1.95 
Intuitively I would say 1.92 1.48 Judging from the competitor 
analysis I would say 
7.08 1.34 
I have an insight that suggests  3.94 2.14 I have data that suggests 
  
7.58 1.66 
My inner voice whispers 1.76 1.41 The market study signals 
 
7.66 1.72 
My gut feeling says 1.92 1.21 The analysis says  8.44 1.61 
 
Note. Measurements were taken on 10-point Likert scale (1 = very intuitive/10 = very analytical). Statements in 
italics were used in Experiments 1-3. 
 
As can be concluded from Table 3.1, the intuitive justifications were generally 
assessed as very intuitive (average values around two) as opposed to the analytic 
justifications that were assessed as very analytical (average values around seven). The only 
exception is “I have an insight that suggests”, for which we found a mean response of 3.94. 
We excluded this justification from the consideration set, because this value lies closer to 
the neutral point (5) than to the intuitive end of the scale. The three statements per 
justification type that we used in the actual experiment are given in italics.  
 
Procedure 
  We use a strategic go/no-go problem as focal marketing task in this study. Go or 
no-go decisions are frequently encountered in marketing, involving whether or not to 
launch a new product in market X or whether or not to introduce a new marketing 
campaign in country Y, for example. Such a problem is classified as a decision making 
problem that lies in the middle of a ‘structuredness’ continuum (Jonassen, 2000). It is thus 
a semi-structured task that requires intuition as well as analysis to arrive at the optimal 
solution and that does not inherently favor one approach over the other. 
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We let participants take on the role of a junior product manager at a fast-moving 
consumer goods company. Their task was to indicate the extent to which they would 
recommend top management to go ahead with a launch of the product they were 
responsible for, an American potato chips product, on a foreign market. The scenario 
stated that the potato chips had already successfully been introduced on the Dutch market 
and that management was now thinking about launching the chips in Italy.   
Respondents were presented with a condensed summary of the marketing 
decision problem on which to base their answer. Before receiving this information, 
participants were told that their decision was very important, that a launch would cost 
millions of Euros and that other investment opportunities would be foregone if they 
decided to invest in the Italian market. After receiving the market information, participants 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they would recommend to launch the product in 
Italy on a slide bar anchored ‘definitely a no-go’ on the left and ‘definitely a go’ on the 
right that corresponded to 0% and 100% respectively on an underlying choice continuum. 
By default, the slide bar knob was located in the middle (50%/50% or indifference 
between the options). 
Because of the importance of the case, participants were then asked to listen to 
what ‘a colleague’ had to say about this issue. This colleague subsequently gave three 
pieces of advice - all favoring a launch of the product - that were either justified by 
intuition, by analysis, or that were not justified. Note that the informative content of the 
three pieces of advice was the same in all justification conditions. The advice content was: 
1.   The market is not too different: Italians are keen on American products. 
2.   Italians will prefer [Brand name] over other salty snacks: it should be a go. 
3. [Brand name] has the potential to drive primary demand and change 
consumption patterns in Italy. 
 
Advice that was justified by intuition started with “My gut tells me”, “If I go with 
what my intuition says” or “Intuitively I would say”, and was then followed by the content 
of the advice (1, 2 or 3). In contrast, advice that was justified by analysis started with “The 
market research data tell me”, “If I go with what the consumer data says” or “Judging from 
the competitor analysis I would say”, and was then followed by the advice content (1, 2 or 
3). Each advice justification form and advice content was used once in a random 
combination so that a total of three pieces of advice were given to a respondent (three 
intuitively justified pieces of advice in the intuitive justification condition; three 
analytically justified pieces of advice in the analytic justification condition). In the no 
justification condition, justification for the advice was left out and read exactly as stated 
above. The order of presentation of the pieces of advice was determined at random. 
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After receiving their colleague’s advice, participants were asked again to indicate 
on a slide bar anchored, ‘definitely a no-go’ on the left and ‘definitely a go’ on the right 
that corresponded to 0% and 100% on the choice continuum respectively, to what extent 
they recommended to launch the potato chip product. Again, the slide bar knob was 
positioned in the middle. 
 
Dependent variable 
Advice utilization in judgment tasks is commonly measured by a formula that 
weighs the extent to which the decision maker’s final answer is a function of her own 
initial answer versus the advisor’s recommendation (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino, 2008; 
Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004). We use a standard measure (Harvey & Fischer, 
1997) that uses the ratio of the difference between the decision maker’s final and initial 
estimate and the difference between the advisor’s estimate and the decision maker’s initial 
estimate,  . Because the advice was strongly in favor of a 
launch we equated the ‘advised decision’ with a virtual position of 100 on the underlying 
choice continuum. The advice taking measure thus reflects the extent to which a 
participant updates in the direction of the advice she received. 
 
Results 
 Seventy-six undergraduate students (55 male, 21 female) participated in this study 
in return for extra course credit. Data from five respondents (four in the intuitive advice 
condition; one in the analytic advice condition) yielded an undefined value because these 
respondents’ initial decisions were exactly the same as the advised decision (100). In these 
cases it is not possible to quantify how much a participant did or did not use the advice. In 
line with previous research (Gino, 2008; Gino & Moore, 2007; Yaniv, 2004), we left out 
these cases in our analysis.  
Results are displayed in Figure 3.1. Our results show that Advice Justification 
significantly influenced Advice taking, F(2, 68) = 5.912, p < .001. Mean Advice taking in 
the intuitive justification condition was significantly lower than it was in both the no 
justification condition, t(52) = -1.85, p = .04, and the analytic justification condition t(42) 
= -3.45, p < .001. Mean Advice taking in the analytic justification condition was 
significantly higher than in the no justification condition t(48) = 1.84, p = .04. 
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Figure 3.1   Study 1—Mean advice taking values and standard deviations per condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Note. Cells with a different superscript differ significantly from each other (p < .05). 
 
Discussion 
 In this first study we found that adding a justification for advice has a strong 
influence on advice utilization, and that the justification form matters substantially. Adding 
an analytic justification to advice was beneficial to advice taking, compared to a situation 
in which a justification was absent. However, adding an intuitive justification turned out to 
be detrimental—no justification at all worked better than an intuitive justification. The 
results of this study seem consistent with the notions discussed before, that people believe 
that intuitive decision making is bad and analytic decision making is good. In fact, the data 
in this study show that an intuitive justification may, in at least some contexts, be worse 
than no justification at all. 
 
Intuition in decision making revisited 
The results from Experiment 1 are in agreement with the traditional beliefs 
discussed earlier: analysis helps and intuition does not; in this experiment it even reduced 
advice taking. The question, then, becomes is this always the case, or are there 
circumstances where intuition is seen as positive and increases the extent to which advice 
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is followed. There are reasons to expect that such conditions exist, especially in the light of 
recent insights about the value of intuition. According to Hogarth (2001), “intuition is a 
source of knowledge, a sixth sense, and intuition should be educated” (p. 23). Payne, 
Bettman and Johnson (1988) found that under time constraints normative, consciously 
driven processes can lead to worse decisions than the use of more heuristic strategies. 
Wilson and Schooler (1991) found in an experiment that respondents (students) did a 
poorer job in choosing college courses when they were asked to carefully analyze the 
reasons for their evaluations, than when they made their choices right away. McMakin and 
Slovic (2000) found that explicit reasoning degraded judgment on an intuitive task 
(predicting how much people like advertisements). In addition, Dijksterhuis (2004) found 
that for such an important life decision as choosing an apartment, consciously thinking 
about your alternatives is a poorer decision making strategy than deciding intuitively (after 
working on a distraction task for a while).  
Interestingly, not only academics but also managers seem to feel increasingly 
confident that they can trust their gut. A survey conducted by Jagdish Parikh (discussed in 
Buchanan and O’Connell, 2006, p. 40) shows that executives used their intuition as much 
as formal analysis, but accredited 80% of their successes to instincts. Hayashi (2001) 
frames several high-profile top management decisions, including the creation of Federal 
Express and the prime-time launch of blockbuster Who Wants to be a Millionaire, as 
intuitive or ‘gut’ decisions. It might well be the case that for certain types of advisors and 
certain types of (marketing) decisions a good deal of intuition on the side of the advisor is 
acceptable or even appreciated. We will examine this in the next two experiments.  
 
Intuitive advice taking & advisor seniority 
In Experiment 1 we found that intuitive advice from another junior product 
manager was not effective in changing the opinion of a junior decision maker. But what if 
the advisor is not a junior, but a senior product manager? Prior research has found that if 
an advisor has task-relevant expertise, or ‘expert power’, decision makers will utilize the 
advice more (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Jungermann & Fischer, 2005). This also holds if 
the decision maker is less knowledgeable or experienced than his advisor (Harvey & 
Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004). Thus, junior decision makers are likely 
take more advice from senior advisors than from equally junior peers. However, it is not 
clear if this effect depends on how the advice is justified. It seems possible that the effect 
of seniority occurs regardless of the type of justification. It also seems possible that the 
negative effect of intuitive justification makes seniority irrelevant, such that intuitive 
justification is not followed regardless of seniority. Finally, it is possible that the seniority 
advantage is especially pronounced for intuitively justified advice. Intuition has been 
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conceptualized as ‘learning shaped by experience’ (Hogarth, 2001, p. 19), therefore the 
more experience we have with something, the better intuition about this will be. 
Furthermore, experienced practitioners have developed sophisticated ‘expert schemas’ that 
positively influence the effectiveness of intuitive decision making (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  
Hence, whereas junior decision makers do not have any cues to assess the 
accuracy of another junior’s intuitive advice, the mere rank of a senior may signal that his 
intuitive advice could be quite accurate. Consequently, the same intuitive advice that is 
completely ignored if it comes from another junior manager may in fact be utilized if it 
comes from a senior manager. Analytical advice, on the other hand, is based on logical 
reasoning that should not be related to years of accumulated experiences in a particular job, 
and therefore its acceptance may be less affected by the seniority of the source of the 
advice. This reasoning is reflected in Hypothesis 1.   
 
Hypothesis 1. The effect of intuitive versus analytical justification on advice taking is 
moderated by the seniority of the advisor, such that the negative effect of intuitive (versus 
analytical) justification is reduced when the advisor has a higher level of seniority than the 
decision maker (relative to when both are equally junior). 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Design 
The second experiment is designed to test Hypothesis 1. The experiment is 
concerned with how advisor seniority affects intuitive and analytic advice taking. We use a 
2 (Advice Justification: by intuition vs. by analysis) x 2 (Advisor Seniority: junior vs. 
senior) between-participants design.  
 
Procedure 
We use the same procedure as in the first experiment and let respondents indicate 
the extent to which they would recommend top management to go ahead with the launch 
of a potato chips product on the Italian market, both before and after receiving advice from 
a colleague. In this study, dependent on the condition participants were assigned to, the 
colleague who presented the advice was either a junior product manager, and thus had the 
same level of seniority as the decision maker, or he was a senior product manager.  
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Results 
One hundred and eighteen undergraduate students (82 male, 36 female) 
participated in this study in return for extra course credit. Data from three participants (two 
in the senior advisor/intuitive advice condition; one in the senior advisor/analytic advice 
condition) were dropped because they yielded an undefined value. 
 
Figure 3.2   Study 2—Mean advice taking values and standard deviations per condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Cells with a different superscript differ significantly from each other (p < .001). 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 3.2. Consistent with the results in Experiment 1, 
we found a main effect of Advice Justification on Advice taking F(1, 111) = 8.965, p < 
.001. Participants utilized more advice if the advice was justified by analysis (M = .32, SD 
= .26) than if the advice was justified by intuition (M = .08, SD = .37). We also found a 
main effect of Advisor Seniority on Advice taking F(1, 111) = 5.440, p < 0.01. Participants 
utilized more advice from a senior advisor (M = .29, SD = .25) than from a junior advisor 
(M = .11, SD = .37).  
  Junior Senior 
Intuitive M  .00a  .25b 
 SD .40 .26 
Analytic M  .30b  .33b 
 SD .29 .23 
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Both main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect of Advice 
Justification and Advisor Seniority on Advice taking F(1, 111) = 4.066, p = 0.02. The 
effect of advice justification type was significantly larger when the advice was offered by 
an equally junior advisor, F(1, 111) = 13.614, p < .001,  than when it was offered by a 
more senior advisor, F < 1, p > .50. Analyzed differently, participants that received 
intuitive advice took more of the advice if it was offered by a senior (M = .25, SD = .26) 
than by a junior advisor (M = .00, SD = .40), F(1, 111) = 9.225, p < .001. Participants that 
received analytic advice, on the other hand, showed no significant difference in advice 
taking dependent on the seniority of the advisor (F < 1, p > .80).  
 
Discussion 
In this study we found that junior decision makers almost completely discounted 
intuitive advice from another junior manager. However when the same intuitive advice 
came from a more senior advisor, it significantly influenced junior decision makers´ 
opinion. Hence, decision makers seem to discount intuitive advice variably dependent on 
advisor seniority. Alternatively, advice that is justified by analysis seems to be robust for 
advisor seniority. Because an analytic justification is based on mindful analysis, the 
decision maker who is evaluating the advice gets some insight into the web of thoughts 
that could have guided the advisor in coming up with the advice. Consequently, other 
possible cues that hint at high-quality advice, such as advisor seniority, may not be 
essential in this case. 
 
Intuitive advice taking & type of marketing task 
In Experiment 2 we found the expected interaction of advice justification and 
advisor seniority on advice taking, but, as can be seen from Figure 3.2, in both seniority 
conditions, the influence of analytic advice is larger than that of intuitive advice (albeit this 
difference is not significant in the case of the senior advisor). Prior research has found that 
intuition can outperform analysis on certain tasks (Dane & Pratt, 2007; McMakin & 
Slovic, 2000). In line with these results, one can ask the question if there are circumstances 
in which intuitive advice is more influential than analytic advice. An important variable 
that could affect the utilization of intuitive advice is the type of marketing task for which 
the advice is given. Dane and Pratt (2007) mention task characteristics as an important set 
of factors that influence the effectiveness of intuition. Using intuition for highly structured 
math and probability problems can lead to highly inaccurate decisions, whereas intuition is 
most appropriate for less structured executive decisions, for example decisions involving 
strategy. Offering support for this theory, intuition has been found to outperform analysis 
on a more intuitive or ill-structured task and analysis has been found to outperform 
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intuition on a more analytic or structured task (McMakin & Slovic, 2000; Shapiro & 
Spence, 1997).  
Well-structured marketing tasks include customer lifetime calculations, market 
budget analysis and sales force planning. Ill-structured marketing tasks, on the other hand, 
include creating advertisements, designing promotions and—in the movie industry— 
developing new movies. The product go/no-go task for the introduction of a new product 
we used so far in this paper is an example of a semi-structured problem that contains a 
mixture of both structured and ill-structured elements (Basadur, Ellspermann, & Evans, 
1994). For such a problem, applying intuition and analysis should both be appropriate 
(Jonassen, 2000). For more ill-structured, or judgmental, marketing tasks, which miss well-
accepted decision rules, pure intuition may lead to better decisions than analysis, as 
research also suggested. 
However, such presumed intuitive superiority in terms of decision quality does 
not necessarily imply that decision makers are also willing to accept intuition as a 
justification for advice in ill-structured tasks. It is possible that the general aversion to 
intuition as a justification for advice (see Experiments 1 and 2) holds even for ill-structured 
tasks. If, in contrast, decision makers do take the ill-structured nature of a decision 
problem into account when processing the justification of advice, advice may be followed 
more if justified by intuition than if justified by analysis. Any such positive effect of 
intuition (versus analysis) should be much more likely to occur for senior than junior 
advisors, as junior advisors have less of the experience that may be required to inform 
accurate intuition. (As argued in Experiment 2, following of analytic advice should be 
much less dependent on seniority).   
 
Hypothesis 2.  On a relatively ill-structured marketing task, the effect of intuitive versus 
analytical justification on advice taking is moderated by the seniority of the advisor, such 
that a positive effect of intuitive (versus analytical) justification is obtained when the 
advisor has a higher level of seniority than the decision maker and no positive effect or a 
weaker positive effect is found when advisor and decision maker are equally junior. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Design 
The third experiment is designed to explore Hypothesis 2. This experiment is 
concerned with how advisor seniority affects intuitive and analytic advice taking, on an ill-
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structured task. As in the second experiment, we employed a 2 (Advice Justification: by 
intuition vs. by analysis) x 2 (Advisor Seniority: junior vs. senior) between-participants 
design.  
 
Pre-test 
In order to ensure that the task we adopt in Study 3 is also perceived by 
respondents as ill-structured, or at least as less structured than the go/no-go task, we 
carried out a pre-test. In a pre-test we had a group of students, drawn from the same 
population as those in our main studies, evaluate the structuredness of different types of 
marketing tasks: a product go/no go task (used in the previous studies), a brand 
consolidation task, an advertisement selection task and a movie selection task. We 
expected the former two tasks to be perceived as more structured than the latter two tasks. 
Beforehand we gave respondents a short explanation of what we meant with 
´structuredness´ of a task. Then, for each task, respondents read an entire problem scenario, 
and subsequently indicated how structured they perceived this task to be, on a scale 
ranging from 0 (well-structured) to 10 (ill-structured). One hundred and fifty-four students 
(107 male, 47 female) participated in the pre-test. 
 
Table 3.2   Mean structuredness ratings and standard deviations per marketing task 
 
 
 
 
Note. Measurements were taken on 11-point Likert scale (0 = well-structured/10 = ill-structured). 
 
Results are displayed in Table 3.2. The product go/no-go and brand consolidation 
tasks concerned types of problems that would be classified by Jonassen (2000) to lie in the 
middle of a continuum ranging from well- to ill-structured. This corresponds well with the 
average perceived structuredness ratings of 5.42 and 5.14 (both closest to the midpoint of 
the scale), respectively. The advertising and movie selection tasks concerned types of 
problems that would be classified by Jonassen to lie to the right of the middle of a 
continuum ranging from well- to ill-structured; they are thus a bit fuzzier. This again 
corresponds rather nicely with the average perceived structuredness ratings of 5.65 and 
6.24 (both closest to the ill-structured (vs. well-structured) end of the scale), respectively. 
Type of marketing task M SD 
Product go/no-go 5.42 1.98 
Brand consolidation 5.14 2.10 
Advertisement selection 5.65 2.22 
Movie selection 6.24 2.22 
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Because it has the lowest structuredness rating, we decided to adopt the movie selection 
task in Study 3. Note that this task is perceived as significantly less structured than the 
go/no-go task that we used for Study 1 and 2, t(154) = 2.002, p = .03. 
 
Procedure 
We thus used a movie selection dilemma as focal marketing task in this study. 
Such a marketing dilemma can be classified as a “case-analysis problem” that lies close to 
the right end of a problem type continuum ranging from well-structured to ill-structured 
(Jonassen, 2000). It is thus a particularly ill-structured problem that requires intuition to 
arrive at the optimal solution.  
 
We let participants take on the role of a junior account manager at a global broad-
based entertainment company. They would supposedly work for the motion pictures 
division of the company and their task was to indicate the extent to which they would 
recommend top management to select one of two movies for marketing and distribution. 
The real movies respondents had to indicate their preference for were Case 39 and Shutter 
Island.  This study was carried out before both movies premiered in the U.S. and as such 
we expected European students to be unfamiliar with them as movies usually premiere 
several months later in Europe.  
Respondents were told that their decision was very important, that the choice for 
one of the movies would be irreversible and that it would cost millions of Euros. After 
receiving a plot synopsis and a film poster for both movies, participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they would select one movie over the other on a slide bar 
anchored ‘definitely Case 39’ on the left and ‘definitely Shutter Island’ on the right that 
corresponded to 0% and 100% respectively on an underlying choice continuum. By 
default, the slide bar knob was located in the middle (50%/50% or indifference between 
the two movies). Because of the importance of the case, participants were then asked to 
listen what a colleague had to say about this issue. Dependent on the condition respondents 
were assigned to, this colleague was either a junior account manager, and thus had the 
same level of seniority as the respondents or he was a senior account manager, and thus 
had a higher level of seniority than the respondents. This colleague subsequently gave 
three pieces of advice - all favoring the selection of Shutter Island - that were either 
justified by intuition or by analysis. Note that the informative content of the three pieces of 
advice was the same in all justification conditions. The advice content was: 
 
1. The summary of Shutter Island will make many people curious about this movie; I 
would pick this one. 
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2. Case 39 has a good chance of success, but Shutter Island will definitely sell more 
tickets. 
3. Shutter Island fits in well with hit series such as Lost and would have real 
blockbuster potential. 
 
As in the first two studies, advice that was justified by intuition started with “My 
gut tells me”, “If I go with what my intuition says” or “Intuitively I would say”, and was 
then followed by the content of the advice (1, 2 or 3). In contrast, advice that was justified 
by analysis started with “The market research data tell me”, “If I go with what the 
consumer data says” or “Judging from the competitor analysis I would say”, and was then 
followed by the content of the advice (1, 2 or 3). Each advice justification form and advice 
content was used once in a random combination so that a total of three pieces of advice 
were given to a respondent (three intuitively justified pieces of advice in the intuitive 
justification condition; three analytically justified pieces of advice in the analytic 
justification condition). The order of presentation of the pieces of advice was determined at 
random. 
After receiving their colleague’s advice, participants were asked again to indicate 
the extent to which they would recommend to select one movie over the other on a slide 
bar anchored ‘definitely Case 39’ on the left and ‘definitely Shutter Island’ on the right 
that corresponded to 0% and 100% respectively on an underlying choice continuum. 
Again, the slide bar knob was positioned in the middle.  
 
Results 
One hundred and two (75 male, 27 female) undergraduate students participated in 
this study in return for extra course credit. Data from nine participants (one in the junior 
advisor/ intuitive advice condition; three in the junior advisors/analytic advice condition; 
four in the senior advisor/intuitive advice condition; one on the senior advisor/analytic 
advice condition) yielded an undefined value on the Harvey and Fischer (1997) measure 
and were dropped from the analysis.  
Results are displayed in Figure 3.3. As in Experiment 1, we found a significant 
interaction effect of Advice Justification and Advisor Seniority on Advice taking, F(1, 89) 
= 3.282, p = .04. Importantly, in the senior advisor condition, there is now a significant 
positive difference between advice that is justified by intuition (M = .50, SD = .36) versus 
advice that is justified by analysis (M = .31, SD = .31), F(1,89) = 4.208, p = .02. In the 
junior advisor condition we find no difference between advice that is justified by intuition 
(M = .28, SD = .30) and advice that is justified by analysis anymore (M = .33, SD = .31), 
F(1, 89) < .05, p > .50.   
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Figure 3.3   Study 3—Mean advice taking values and standard deviations per condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Cells with a different superscript differ significantly from each other (p < .05). 
 
Discussion 
With this study we demonstrate that, on an ill-structured task, the influence of 
intuitive advice of a senior advisor can outweigh the influence of analytic advice. 
Moreover, the influence of the intuitive advice of a junior advisor is boosted to the level of 
her analytic advice (see Figure 3), such that there is no significant difference in advice 
utilization dependent on the different advice justifications anymore. Again we find that 
intuitive advice is utilized variably dependent on advisor seniority, but this time we find 
that intuitive advice outweighs analytic advice, a reversal of the results of Experiment 2. 
The most important take-away from this study is that in certain cases, justifying advice on 
the basis of intuition is actually more effective than justifying advice based on analysis.  
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General Discussion 
 
Consulting others is an important element of decision making by professional 
marketers. It is common practice for a manager to seek advice from a colleague or a 
consultant to arrive at a better decision, or to share responsibility for the outcome (Harvey 
& Fischer, 1997). As the body of research on advice utilization expands, we know that 
several factors impact the extent to which advice is utilized. However, no prior research 
has investigated the influence of how a piece of advice is justified on subsequent advice 
utilization. In this paper we address this question by looking at the influence of an intuitive 
versus an analytic justification for advice on advice taking. Intuitive decision making 
traditionally does not have a strong reputation, but more recent work suggests that intuition 
can be as good as, or even superior to analysis. It is therefore a priori not evident, how a 
decision maker will weigh the same advice that is justified by intuition or by analysis.  
             Participants across three experiments show variable discounting of intuitive 
advice. In the first experiment they discount advice they receive from a colleague about a 
product go or no-go decision completely if it is justified by intuition, whereas they 
significantly update their decision in the direction of the advice if it is justified by analysis. 
Compared to a control condition in which respondents were not offered any justification 
for the advice they received, adding an intuitive substantiation was detrimental to advice 
taking, whereas adding an analytic substantiation was beneficial. Where prior research has 
found that adding any justification for a request increases compliance (Langer, Blank, & 
Chanowitz, 1978), we find that adding an intuitive justification decreases compliance 
compared to a condition in which no justification is offered at all. We reason that this 
occurs because decision makers cannot assess the accuracy of their advisor’s intuition and 
might consider it equivalent to sloppy thinking. Without any other cue that would hint at 
the quality of the advisor’s intuition, decision makers may not utilize it. 
          In the second experiment we therefore manipulated the seniority of the advisor 
giving the advice: the advisor was either a senior manager, which suggest a high level of 
experience, or a junior manager, like the decision maker. Seniority signals more expertise 
and knowledge and, hence, a better educated intuition. Consequently we predicted that if 
the advisor was a senior manager, the utilization of intuitive advice would increase. Indeed 
we found that if decision makers received advice from a junior advisor intuitive advice was 
completely discounted, whereas analytic advice resulted in opinion change. But if the 
advice was given by a senior advisor, we observed no significant difference in advice 
utilization dependent on the type of advice justification. To put it differently, we found that 
intuitive advice was utilized variably dependent on advisor seniority, whereas analytic 
advice was not. Presumably, advisor seniority offers a cue to the accuracy of intuitive 
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advice: senior advisors are more experienced and have built up more relevant expertise, 
which is a solid argument to assume that their intuition is accurate. Analytic advice, on the 
other hand, is considered accurate per se and its influence on advice taking is therefore not 
affected by other accuracy cues like advisor seniority. 
            In the third experiment we sought to extend our scope by altering the type of 
marketing problem for which the advice was given. Because the effectiveness of intuition 
has been found to be dependent on the structuredness of a task (Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Shapiro & Spence, 1997), we reasoned that the influence of intuitive advice might become 
stronger if the task would be less structured. In Experiment 3 respondents therefore 
received advice, from a junior or a senior advisor, about the selection of one of two movies 
for marketing and distribution. A movie selection task is considered less structured than a 
go/no-go task and the results of our pre-test confirm this. On this task we found that 
intuitive and analytic advices were weighed equally if provided by a junior, and that 
intuitive advice indeed exerted a stronger influence on advice taking than analytic advice if 
provided by a senior. Here again we found that intuitive advice is discounted variably 
dependent on advisor seniority, whereas analytic advice is not. And more importantly, if 
the task is ill-structured, decision makers may prefer intuitive advice over analytic advice. 
          In short, we learn from the three studies discussed above that advice justification can 
have a strong influence on advice taking and that the same advice content can be evaluated 
more or less positively dependent on whether it is justified by intuition or by analysis. 
Moreover, a key take-away from this research is that if marketing managers are not more 
experienced than the person seeking advice, they can sometimes better refrain from giving 
intuitive advice. Unless the marketing problem is truly ill-structured, such advice may not 
be utilized at all. If a marketing manager is more experienced than the person seeking 
advice, intuitive advice may be just as well, or even better, received as analytic advice. 
Intuitive advice is thus utilized variably, dependent on other cues in this advice taking 
context that hint at the possible accuracy of intuition. Analytic advice, in contrast, seems to 
be quite robust for the influence of additional cues. 
 
            Apart from the substantive contribution of this research as discussed above, another 
contribution of this paper is that we investigated advice utilization in a marketing setting, 
where different dynamics may come into play than in the standard advice study. To the 
best of our knowledge, no study to date has investigated advice utilization in a marketing 
setting. In the bulk of advice studies so far, the decision task is a straightforward numeric 
estimation task in which subjects have to estimate, for example, the year in which a 
specific event took place, the weight of another person or the number of squares in a screen 
(Gino, 2008; Gino & Moore, 2007; Harries, Harvey, & Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv 
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& Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). Because of the ambiguity inherent in 
most marketing tasks, decision makers may apply a different set of decision rules when 
evaluating a piece of advice. This contributes to the external validity of our work. 
              Nevertheless, we acknowledge that even though we tried to mimic a marketing 
decision setting best as possible, real life always remains different from any artificial lab 
setting. In addition, many other cues may play a role in evaluating colleague advice, such 
as prior relationships with a colleague, which were not considered here. Moreover, 
respondents in our experiments were business students and not real marketing managers 
(yet). Whereas we do not expect the direction of our effects to change, it is possible that 
experienced managers hold different opinions about solving marketing cases and accepting 
or denying specific advice than business students. As a suggestion for future research we 
would therefore propose to do a similar type of research with managers in the field. In 
addition, we did not manipulate problem structuredness in a controlled manner. It is not 
clear if such a controlled, clean manipulation is possible in the context of complex 
marketing problems, but it is definitely worth striving for. Moreover, further research 
could investigate how decision makers would weigh juxtaposed intuitive and analytic 
advice that they receive from multiple advisors. Lastly, other factors in the advice taking 
context could be manipulated to see what their effect on intuitive and analytic advice 
taking would be. Interesting issues would be the effect of an internal versus an external 
advisor, and whether or not the fee of the advisor acts as a signal of how good intuitive 
advice is. This is worthwhile to study especially in the light of recent findings that show 
that people value advice from others more when it costs money than when it is free (Gino, 
2008). 
                Marketing consulting is a very important activity and accounts for large sums of 
money. However, expensive and often good advice is frequently not taken. Our results 
suggest that this problem can be mitigated by justifying the advice in a way that is 
appropriate to the marketing problem at hand and the seniority of the advisor. To the best 
of our knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effects of advice justification on 
advice taking. It provides some initial insights. We hope that more research will follow. 
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Understanding Emotions in Advice Taking:  
The Role of Emotion Valence, Focus, and Context3 
 
 
More often than not we seek recommendations from others about what we should do in 
certain situations. For managerial decisions such as whether to launch a new product or 
whether to downsize, for professional decisions such as where to apply for a new job, and 
also for personal decisions such as which partner to choose or what house to buy, we often 
receive advice from others. The degree to which this advice is taken into account has been 
shown to depend on many characteristics that can be classified as pertaining to the decision 
maker, to the advisor, and to the recommendation itself (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).  
Even though emotions have been shown both theoretically and empirically to play 
a crucial role in decision making (for reviews see Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; 
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), existing advice research has hardly considered the influence 
of emotions on advice taking. The absence of research on role of emotions in advice taking 
is is suprising given that advice taking is a common organizational behavior and research 
on emotions in the workplace is ‘hot’ and comprehensive (see for example Brief & Weiss, 
2002; Gooty, Gavin, & Ashkanasy, 2009). The present research aims to develop a better 
understanding of the role of emotions in the advice process. The core idea is that the effect 
of a specific emotion on advice taking is dependent upon its valence, focus, and context. 
We present three experiments in which we study the effects of four different emotions on 
advice taking that are consistent with this idea. We think that our account of emotions 
provides a new and essential insight into how their influence on advice taking can be 
understood.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Based on De Hooge & Tzioti, 2010. 
56 Understanding Emotions in Advice Taking 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
Advice taking & emotions 
Even though people are often eager to get the opinion of other people as input into 
their decision making process, this advice is often not utilized to the extent that one could 
truly benefit from it. Instead, most decision makers utilize received advice by a “token” 
amount of approximately 25% in the direction of a recommended course of action (Harvey 
& Fischer, 1997; Soll & Larrick, 1999). This advice discounting may occur due to 
different levels of access to thoughts and justifications for arriving at a particular decision 
between the decision maker and the advisor (Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), 
due to the initial response functioning as an anchor that is insufficiently adjusted upon 
receiving advice (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Lim & O’Connor, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), or due to egocentric tendencies to prefer one’s own opinion as the superior one 
(Krueger, 2003). Moreover, characteristics of the advisor, the decision maker and the 
advice (task) itself have been shown to influence how receptive people are to a specific 
recommendation. For example, decision makers have been found to put a higher weight on 
received advice when the advisor has task-relevant expertise (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; 
Sniezek & Buckley, 1995), is trustworthy (Jungermann & Fischer, 2005; Van Swol & 
Sniezek, 2005), or is older or better educated (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006). Furthermore, 
advice taking increases when the decision maker has reward power or prepays for the 
advice (Gino, 2008; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001), when the task is complex (Schrah, Dalal, 
& Sniezek, 2006), or when the advice is of high quality (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
Together, these studies suggest that advice taking can vary significantly dependent on 
several different factors in the advice situation. 
An abundance of research questions about advice taking have thus been 
addressed, but the empirical record so far has not shed much light upon the role of 
emotions in this process. The absence of emotion research in the field of advice taking is 
especially puzzling because emotions can be understood as psychological processes that 
guide decision making and behavior (Keltner & Gross, 1999). Indeed, ample empirical 
research has shown emotions to exert different influences on decisions concerning risk, 
consumption, cooperation, negotiation, and justice (e.g., De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Loewenstein, 1996; Skoe, Eisenberg, & 
Cumberland, 2002; Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009). Moreover, emotions have 
been shown to affect important organizational behaviors such as work performance (Beal, 
Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005), job satisfacation (Brief & Weiss, 2002), and 
prosocial behavior (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). Given that emotions often arise in the 
workplace, they will play an important role in the interpersonal advice taking process in 
organizations as well. 
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Emotions react to signals in the environment that one’s concerns are at stake and 
motivate goal-directed decisions that serve to protect and promote these concerns (Frijda, 
1986, 2004; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). In the case of positive emotions (e.g. pride), 
attainment of a personal concern is going well or within reach (e.g. excelling in a business 
competition), and the emotion arises to signal that one should continue acting in a similar 
fashion, or that one’s goals are reached and one can decide to stop behaving in that certain 
way (e.g. closing the deal). In the case of negative emotions (e.g. anger), a personal 
concern is threatened (e.g. a colleague receives your promotion), and the emotion arises to 
signal this problem and to focus all attention on decisions that close the gap (e.g. working 
harder) between the present situation and that goal (e.g. getting the next promotion). 
Because different problems need different solutions, different emotions will arise and they 
will stimulate different behaviors (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). This may result in 
different degrees of advice taking and in turn different decision outcomes. Hence, we argue 
that it is insightful and important to develop a better understanding of emotions in advice 
taking. 
 
The role of emotion valence in advice taking 
Recently, some first empirical support for our claim that emotions influence 
advice taking has been provided. In two studies, Gino and Schweitzer (2008) addressed the 
influence of a negative emotion, anger, and of a positive emotion, gratitude, on advice 
taking. They hypothesized that, because positive emotions result in a heightened 
experience of trust in another person and negative emotions result in a perception of others 
as untrustworthy, positive emotions would motivate advice taking and negative emotions 
would decrease advice taking. In a first study, participants estimated the weight of 
individuals twice. Before estimating the weights for the second time, participants saw a 
neutral, anger- or gratitude-inducing video clip. In addition, they received advice 
concerning the weight estimation task in the form of estimates from a fellow student. The 
results showed that an induction of anger decreased the tendency to follow the advice from 
the fellow student, while an induction of gratitude increased the tendency to follow that 
same advice. A second study replicated these findings and showed that these effects were 
mediated by the perceived trustworthiness of the advisor.  
To date, the work by Gino and Schweitzer is the only research that addresses the 
role of emotions in advice taking. These authors’ findings suggest that negative emotions 
can decrease advice taking, while positive emotions can increase advice taking. The 
question we address here is whether these effects on advice taking generalize to other 
negatively and positively valenced emotions. We have reason to assume that differences in 
emotion focus and emotion context may give rise to different effects on advice taking.  
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The role of emotion focus in advice taking 
Emotions can be divided into different groups on the basis of multiple elements. 
For example, emotions are often partitioned on the basis of their valence; that is their 
positivity or negativity (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). Importantly, 
emotions can also be divided on the basis of their focus—that is, they can be other-focused 
or self-focused (Smith, 2000; Smith, Eyre, Powell, & Kim, 2006). As the word already 
implies, other-focused emotions concern appraisals concentrated upon others in one’s 
social environment (Frijda, 2005). Attention is paid to the world, and the emotional 
experience is about an object or event. For instance, feelings of anger concern a perceived 
threat or belief that one has been intentionally mistreated by another person, object, or 
procedure (Averill, 1980; Berkowitz, 1990). Feelings of gratitude arise in response to 
another person’s benevolence, to an appraisal of being the recipient of especially 
unexpected or costly benefits provided by another person (McCullough, Kimeldorf, & 
Cohen, 2008; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). As a consequence, decisions following 
from other-focused emotions are often related to the target of the emotional appraisal. 
Reflecting this point, anger has been shown to motivate distrust, aggression and violence 
towards one’s obstructer (Berkowitz, 1990), while gratitude has been found to motivate 
trust and prosocial actions towards one’s benefactor (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Clark, 
Northrop, & Barkshire, 1988). 
On the contrary, self-focused emotions shift attention from the world to oneself 
(Frijda, 2005). The emotional experience is about aspects of one’s own person. For 
example, feelings of shame arise after a moral transgression or incompetence in which 
people perceive themselves to have violated a moral or social standard (Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996). Feelings of pride concern a (scholastic, occupational, or athletic) 
achievement or a meeting or exceeding of morally relevant standards (Tangney et al., 
2007), and give rise to a focus on the self, positive self-esteem, and feelings of confidence 
and accomplishment (Tracy & Robins, 2004, 2007b). As a consequence, decisions 
following from self-focused emotions are mainly related to oneself. As a case in point, 
shame has been found to motivate prosocial actions to restore oneself and to conform to 
group standards (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; De Hooge, Zeelenberg & 
Breugelmans, 2010; Izard, 1977), while pride has been shown to motivate achievement 
behaviors to improve oneself and to conform to standards of worth or merit (Tracy & 
Robins, 2007a).  
We propose that due to the interpersonal setting of advice taking, other-focused 
and self-focused emotions exert distinct influences on the advice taking process. These 
influences are moreover contingent upon the valence of the emotion. When an other-
focused emotion is negative, the emotion conveys that another person’s abilities, 
motivations or needs are not in line with one’s own wishes or demands (Haidt, 2003; 
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Smith et al., 2006). On the contrary, when a self-focused emotion is negative, the emotion 
conveys that one’s own abilities or motivations are not line with or below one’s own 
standards (Tangney et al., 2007). Accordingly, we think that if decision makers experience 
negative other-focused emotions, they will put more weight on their own opinion and take 
less advice compared to a situation in which decision makers experience negative self-
focused emotions. In contrast, when an other-focused emotion is positive, the emotion 
conveys that another person’s abilities, motivations, or needs are in line with or even 
exceeds one’s own wishes or demands (Haidt, 2003; McCullough et al., 2008). On the 
other side of the coin, when the self-focused emotion is positive, the emotion conveys that 
one’s own abilities or motivations are in line with or exceed one’s own standards (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004; 2007a). Consequently, we think that if decision makers experience positive 
other-focused emotions, they will put less weight on their own opinion and take more 
advice compared to a situation in which they experience positive self-focused emotions.  
 
The role of emotion context in advice taking 
Not only the focus of an emotion, but also the context of an emotion will play an 
important role in the understanding of emotions in advice taking. Emotion research has 
recently started to make a distinction between two different types of emotion contexts or 
emotion influences. These two different types have been given different names like 
integral versus incidental emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), task-related versus incidental 
affect (Garg, Inman, & Mittal, 2005) and endogenous versus exogenous influences 
(Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). We prefer to use the terms 
exogenous and endogenous because they precisely capture whether the influence comes 
from within (endogenous) or outside (exogenous) the goal-striving process. To avoid 
confusion, in the present research these different kinds of emotion influences are captured 
by the term emotion context. Emotion influences are referred to as endogenous when they 
concern behaviors in situations that are related to the emotion-causing event. These 
influences are relevant for the decision at hand and an integral part of the goal-striving 
process (Zeelenberg et al., 2008). This type of influence occurs for example when feelings 
of gratitude towards a colleague who helped with a product launch influences a decision 
maker’s choice to comply with advice received from that same colleague on a subsequent 
product launch. On the other hand, exogenous influences concern behaviors in situations 
that are not related to the emotion-causing event. These influences are irrelevant to the 
decision at hand and are external to the goal-striving process. Examples of exogenous 
influences are the spill-over effects of emotions resulting from a prior experience, such as 
watching a happy or a sad movie, on subsequent, unrelated decisions, such as deciding 
how much to comply with advice from a friend to apply for a new job. As we will explain 
below, we think that endogenous and exogenous influences of emotions interact with the 
focus of an emotion and affect advice taking accordingly.  
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When the influence is endogenous, other-focused emotions convey relevant 
information concerning an advisor’s abilities to provide good advice. In contrast, when the 
influence is exogenous, the decision situation is different from the emotion-causing 
situation, and the same other-focused emotion may convey less clear information about an 
advisor’s ability to provide good advice in the new decision situation. Hence, we suggest 
that when the influence of emotions is endogenous, experiencing negative other-focused 
emotions (clearly indicating that the advisor will not provide good advice) will result in 
less advice taking compared to when the influence of emotions is exogenous. Conversely, 
when the influence of emotions is endogenous, experiencing positive other-focused 
emotions (clearly indicating that the advisor will provide good advice) will result in more 
advice taking compared to when the influence of emotions is exogenous. 
Such a reversed pattern can also be expected for self-focused emotions. When the 
influence is endogenous, self-focused emotions convey relevant information concerning 
one’s own ability to make good decisions. In contrast, when the influence is exogenous, 
the decision situation is different from the emotion-causing situation, and self-focused 
emotions convey less clear information about one’s ability to make good decisions in the 
new decision situation. Consequently, we suggest that if the influence of emotions is 
endogenous, experiencing negative self-focused emotions (clearly indicating that one’s 
own decision will not provide a good result) will result in more advice taking compared to 
when the influence of emotions is exogenous. Conversely, when the influence of emotions 
is endogenous, experiencing positive self-focused emotions (clearly indicating that one’s 
own decision will provide a good result) will result in less advice taking compared to when 
the influence of emotions is exogenous. 
There are at least two reasons why the effects of emotion focus and of emotion 
context on advice taking have never been documented before. First, the single existing 
study on emotions in advice taking focused on the importance of valence, thereby studying 
two emotions that were both other-focused (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). The valence 
approach has stimulated much research and provided many insights into the differential 
effects of negative and positive emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
1999, 2006). However, this approach overlooks the more complex aspect that different 
emotions have different goals, and thus that emotions with the same valence may motivate 
different behaviors (De Hooge et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 
1999). In particular, the relevance of different discrete emotions to organizational 
behaviors may be vastly different (Gooty, Gavin, & Ashkanasy, 2009). We predict that 
when studying multiple emotions with the same valence, results will reveal that emotions 
with the same valence but with different foci can exert different influences on advice 
taking. 
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Second, many previous studies on effects of emotions in decision making, 
including the studies of Gino and Schweitzer (2008), have focused on carry-over effects of 
emotions. Revealing these exogenous effects that should logically not occur is appealing 
because it shows the fallibility of man and gives an interesting overview of emotional 
effects. Yet these effects do not always give insights into how and when emotions work in 
the service of goal pursuit (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). In order to develop a more 
thorough understanding of emotions in advice taking, the present research will be the first 
to compare the effects of both endogenous and exogenous influences of emotions on 
advice taking. 
 
Examining emotions in advice taking 
Let us summarize: the current research addresses the role that emotions play in 
advice taking. Thus far, the single existing research on emotions and advice taking has 
shown that experiencing negative emotions (from a prior unrelated event) results in less 
advice taking and that experiencing positive emotions results in more advice taking (Gino 
& Schweitzer, 2008). The present research aims to demonstrate the importance of emotion 
focus and of emotion context in this process. For negative emotions, we hypothesize that 
feeling other-focused emotions results in less advice taking when emotions are endogenous 
(relevant to the decision situation) instead of exogenous (not relevant to the decision 
situation), whereas feeling self-focused emotions results in more advice taking when 
emotions are endogenous instead of exogenous. For positive emotions, we predict that 
feeling other-focused emotions results in more advice taking when emotions are 
endogenous instead of exogenous, whereas feeling self-focused emotions results in less 
advice taking when emotions are endogenous instead of exogenous. An overview of the 
emotions and our main hypotheses can be found in Table 4.1. 
In order to provide a thorough test of our predictions, we conducted three experiments 
using different emotion inductions and different advice tasks. In most advice studies, one 
of two types of tasks is used: a “judgment” or a “choice” task (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). In 
the first task variation, the decision maker has to estimate probabilities that events will 
occur (e.g. Budescu & Rantilla, 2000; Gino & Moore, 2007). The advice is then typically 
expressed as “The advisor’s estimate is X”. In Experiment 1, we studied the role of 
emotion context in other-focused emotions and used such a judgment task. We induced 
anger and gratitude with an autobiographical recall procedure and measured the extent to 
which decision makers used received advice when making product sales estimates. Note 
that the emotions in Experiment 1 are the same emotions as used in the studies by Gino 
and Schweitzer (2008).  
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Table 4.1   Differences between Anger, Gratitude, Shame and Pride according to Emotion 
Literature and Hypothesized Effect of Emotion on Advice Taking 
 
 
Emotion Reference 
 Anger Gratitude Shame Pride  
      
Eliciting 
event 
Receiving 
unfair treatment 
Receiving 
benevolence 
Incompetence 
of oneself 
Competence of 
oneself 
(Tangney et al., 
2007; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996) 
Appraisal Other hurt me Other benefitted 
me 
I hurt myself I benefitted 
myself 
 
(Haidt, 2003) 
Action 
tendency 
Move against, 
retaliate 
Return benefit Conform to 
norms 
Excel (Frijda et al., 1989; 
Izard, 1991) 
 
Valence 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
(Frijda et al., 
1989; Roseman 
et al., 1994) 
Focus Other-focus Other-focus Self-focus Self-focus (Frijda, 2005; 
Smith 2000) 
      
Effect on 
advice taking 
Endogenous < 
exogenous 
Endogenous > 
exogenous 
Endogenous > 
exogenous 
Endogenous < 
exogenous 
Hypotheses 
 
In the second type of task that is often used in advice studies, a choice task, the 
decision maker has to choose between multiple options, for example A, B or C (e.g. 
Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). The advice is then typically expressed as “Choose Option X”. 
In Experiments 2 and 3 we used a variation of such a typical choice task. In a traditional 
choice task, the decision maker has to choose between two qualitatively different 
alternatives, for example between investing in stocks or bonds. On such tasks, advice 
taking is often measured by a “matching” principle that looks at consistency between the 
decision maker’s final decision and the advice (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van 
Swol, 2001). This method has the inherent drawback of not being able to assess the net 
impact of the given advice, unless the decision maker’s initial opinion is different from the 
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advised option and she changes her final decision in accordance with the advice (Bonaccio 
& Dalal, 2006). In order to avoid such drawbacks, we used a choice continuum. Instead of 
choosing one alternative, participants indicated the extent to which they would prefer one 
alternative over the other on a continuous slide bar (e.g. 70% in favor of option X), both 
before and after receiving advice favoring one of the options. This measure enabled us to 
quantify the extent to which advice actually exerts an influence on the decision outcome 
more precisely.  
In Experiment 2 we studied the role of emotion focus and emotion context for 
negatively valenced emotions. We induced the other-focused emotion anger and the self-
focused emotion shame with a scenario and measured their influence on advice taking in a 
managerial decision situation. Finally, in Experiment 3 we looked at the role of emotion 
focus and emotion context for positively valenced emotions. We induced the other-focused 
emotion gratitude and the self-focused emotion pride with a scenario and measured their 
influence on advice taking in a managerial decision situation.  
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
Ninety undergraduate students (45 males and 45 females, Mage = 21.67, SD = 
1.81) participated in a series of unrelated studies for extra course credit. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Emotion: gratitude vs. anger) u 2 (Emotion 
Context: endogenous vs. exogenous) between-subjects design with advice taking as 
dependent variable. 
Participants were asked to assume the role of junior marketing manager at a 
company that brands premium coffee. Their task was to make a three-month estimate for 
the sales of two new coffee blends that would soon be launched on the Dutch market on a 
trial basis. Participants were presented with details about the two new coffee blends, 
containing information such as the base and origin, the intensity and the preferred way of 
drinking the coffee. In addition, they received some background information about the 
company, the average monthly sales figure of an average coffee blend, and the popularity 
of existing and new blends. The scenario also emphasized the importance of making 
accurate sales estimates by mentioning the costs involved with the coffees being out-of-
stock as well as having excess stock at the end of the trial. After having received all the 
information, participants indicated their three-month sales estimates for both coffee blends.  
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Subsequently, participants continued with an ostensibly unrelated task, which was 
actually our emotion induction manipulation. We used an autobiographical recall 
procedure, an induction method that is often used in emotion research (adopted from De 
Hooge et al., 2008). In such a procedure, participants recall and report about a personal 
experience in which they felt a certain emotion. In our study, participants reported a 
personal experience in which they felt very grateful (gratitude condition) or an experience 
in which they felt very angry (anger condition). They worked on the emotion induction 
questionnaire for approximately 10 minutes. To check if the emotion manipulation worked 
properly, participants indicated how much gratitude, anger, shame and pride they felt in the 
described situation immediately after the emotion induction. All emotions were rated on 
11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). 
Participants then continued with the next part of the sales estimation task in which 
they received information from another junior marketing manager employed at the 
company. In the endogenous condition, participants imagined that the junior marketing 
manager was the person towards whom they felt gratitude (gratitude condition) or anger 
(anger condition) in the situation that they had just described. In the exogenous condition, 
participants imagined that the junior marketing manager was a random person whom they 
had never met before and who thus did not know anything about them. Participants were 
told that because of the importance of making accurate sales estimates, they had to 
evaluate the case with their colleague, who subsequently presented them with his or her 
three-month sales estimates for both coffee blends. After receiving the colleague’s input, 
participants were asked to indicate their final sales estimates. To avoid any decision 
making based on fallacious or biased memory, participants were provided with their own 
initial estimates as well as their colleague’s estimates on the same screen. After completion 
of all tasks participants were thanked and debriefed. 
To capture the extent to which decision makers rely on advice we use a common 
measure of advice taking that is often used in prior research (see Bonaccio & Dalal; 
Harvey & Fischer, 1997). The formula essentially weighs the extent to which a decision 
maker’s final estimate is a function of her own estimate versus the advisor’s estimate. 
Specifically, the measure uses the ratio of the difference between a decision maker’s final 
and initial estimate and the difference between the advisor’s recommendation and the 
decision maker’s initial estimate (Harvey & Fischer, 1997): 
 . The advice taking measure 
thus reflects how much a participant reacts to the advice she received in forming her final 
decision. The closer the Advice taking value lies to 1, the more advice the participant 
incorporated in forming her final decision. In our study, the dependent variable was 
calculated by taking the mean of the advice taking measure for both coffee blends.  
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Emotion manipulation check. Our manipulations of gratitude and anger were 
successful: participants in the gratitude condition (M = 8.74, SD = 1.42) reported more 
gratitude than participants in the anger condition (M = 2.60, SD = 2.31), t(88) = 15.33, p < 
.01, and more gratitude than other emotions, all ts(46) > 6.22, ps < .01. Participants in the 
anger condition (M = 8.51, SD = 1.87) reported more anger than participants in the 
gratitude condition (M = 2.74, SD = 2.97), t(88) = 10.90, p < .01, and more anger than 
other emotions, all ts(42) > 7.22, ps < .01. The conditions did not differ on the other 
emotions. 
Advice taking. We hypothesized that feeling positive other-focused emotions 
would result in more advice taking in endogenous compared to exogenous situations, while 
feeling negative other-focused emotions would result in less advice taking in endogenous 
compared to exogenous situations. More specifically, we predicted that experiencing 
endogenous (vs. exogenous) gratitude would result in more advice taking, whereas 
experiencing endogenous (vs. exogenous) anger would result in less advice taking.  
 
Figure 4.1   Study 1 – Mean advice taking values per condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.1. The findings supported our hypothesis: A 2 
(Emotion: gratitude vs. anger) u 2 (Emotion Context: endogenous vs. exogenous) ANOVA 
with advice taking as dependent variable showed a significant main effect of Emotion, F(1, 
86) = 4.97, p = .03, ηp2 = .06. Participants in the gratitude condition (M = .58, SD =.32) 
utilized significantly more advice compared to participants in the anger condition (M = .45, 
SD = .28). We found no significant main effect of Emotion Context, F(1, 86) = 0.87, p = 
.35, ηp2 = .01. More importantly, the results showed a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 
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86) = 12.99, p < .01, ηp2 = .13. The effects of gratitude and anger on advice taking differed 
for endogenous and exogenous influences. Participants in the gratitude condition utilized 
more advice if this emotion was felt endogenously (M = .71, SD = .29) than if this emotion 
was felt exogenously (M = .44, SD = .29), F(1, 86) = 10.80, p < .01. Participants in the 
anger condition, on the other hand, utilized significantly less advice if this emotion was felt 
endogenously (M = .37, SD = .23) than if this emotion was felt exogenously (M = .53, SD 
= .32), F(1, 86) = 2.391, p = .03.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provides first support for our theory that endogenous and 
exogenous influences of other-focused emotions can exert different effects on advice 
taking. Decision makers experiencing the positive other-focused emotion gratitude took 
more advice if the emotion context was endogenous instead of exogenous, while decision 
makers experiencing the negative other-focused emotion anger took less advice if the 
emotion context was endogenous instead of exogenous. To replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1 on a different task and to study the differences between self-focused and 
other-focused emotions we conducted Experiment 2. In Experiment 2 we looked at two 
negatively valenced emotions that differed in focus, namely the other-focused emotion 
anger and the self-focused emotion shame.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
Method 
Eighty eight undergraduate students (51 males and 37 females, Mage = 21.10, SD = 
2.32) participated in a series of unrelated studies for extra course credit. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Emotion: anger vs. shame) u 2 (Emotion 
Context: endogenous vs. exogenous) between-subjects design with advice taking as 
dependent variable.  
Participants assumed the role of a junior product manager at a fast-moving 
consumer goods company. Their task was to indicate the extent to which they would 
recommend top management to launch the product they were responsible for, a potato chip 
product, on the Italian market. Participants were presented with a condensed summary of 
the marketing decision problem on which to base their answer. To encourage involvement, 
they were told that a launch would cost millions of Euros and that other investment 
opportunities would be foregone if they decided to invest in the Italian market. Participants 
subsequently indicated the extent to which they would recommend to launch the potato 
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chip product on a slide bar anchored ‘definitely a no-go’ on the left and ‘definitely a go’ on 
the right that corresponded to 0 and 100 respectively on an underlying choice continuum. 
By default, the slide bar knob was located in the middle (50/50 - indifference). Because of 
the importance of their decision, participants then had to evaluate the case together with 
another junior product manager. They were asked to imagine: 
A couple of months ago you had a problem in an area that is unrelated to the 
decision that you have to make right now, namely in your personal life. The problems in 
your personal life had a strong negative influence on your mood. Your colleague Thomas 
then offered to help you. 
In the anger condition, participants then read: “Eventually you decided to accept 
Thomas’ help, but this help was actually a great obstruction in solving your personal 
problems. You are still very angry with Thomas for helping you so poorly.” In the shame 
condition, participants read: “Eventually you decided not to accept Thomas’ help, but 
without this help you greatly obstructed yourself in solving your personal problems. You 
are still very ashamed because you, without Thomas’ help, helped yourself so poorly.” A 
pretest of these materials (N = 32, Mage = 19.85) showed that, on a scale ranging from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (very strongly), participants in the anger condition reported feeling 
significantly more anger (M = 5.81, SD = 1.80) than participants in the shame condition, 
(M = 4.25, SD = 2.15), t(30) = 2.23, p = .03, and that participants in the shame condition 
reported feeling significantly more shame (M = 6.69, SD = 2.06) than participants in the 
anger condition, (M = 2.25, SD = 2.49), t(30) = 5.50, p < .01.  
 
After the emotion induction, participants received information from their 
colleague about the product launch case. This information consisted of three different 
comments that all contained specific arguments in favor of a launch of the potato chip 
product. In the endogenous condition, the colleague was the person from the scenario 
(Thomas). In the exogenous condition, the colleague did not know anything about the 
scenario. Note that, as in Experiment 1, the only difference between the endogenous and 
exogenous conditions was the person offering advice. After receiving their colleague’s 
advice, participants again indicated to what extent they recommended to launch the 
product on the slide bar. After fulfilling all tasks, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
To calculate our dependent variable, we again used the measure of advice taking 
introduced by Harvey and Fischer (1997). Because the advice was strongly in favor of a 
launch we equated the advisor recommendation with a virtual position of 100 on the 
underlying choice continuum.  
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We hypothesized that feeling negative emotions would result in less advice taking 
when it concerned an other-focused instead of a self-focused emotion. Moreover, we 
hypothesized that feeling negative other-focused emotions would result in less advice 
taking in endogenous compared to exogenous situations, while feeling negative self-
focused emotions would result in more advice taking in endogenous situations compared to 
exogenous situations. More specifically, we predicted that experiencing anger instead of 
shame would result in less advice taking; that endogenous (vs. exogenous) anger would 
result in less advice taking, and that experiencing endogenous (vs. exogenous) shame 
would result in more advice taking.  
 
Figure 4.2   Study 2 – Mean advice taking values per condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.2. The findings offered support for our 
hypotheses. A 2 (Emotion: anger vs. shame) u 2 (Emotion Context: endogenous vs. 
exogenous) ANOVA with advice taking as dependent variable showed a marginally 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(1, 84) = 1.72, p = .09, ηp2 = .02. Participants in the 
anger condition (M = .15, SD = .33) used less advice than participants in the shame 
condition (M = .22, SD =.25). We did not find a significant main effect of Emotion 
Context, F(1, 84) = 0.17, p = .68, ηp2 < .01. Importantly, the results showed a significant 
two-way interaction, F(1, 84) = 8.64, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. The effects of shame and of anger 
on advice taking differed for endogenous and exogenous influences. Replicating 
Experiment 1, participants in the anger condition utilized significantly less advice if this 
emotion was felt endogenously (M = .04, SD = .21) than if this emotion was felt 
exogenously (M = .24, SD = .29), F(1, 84) = 5.88, p = .02. In contrast, participants in the 
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shame condition utilized significantly more advice if this emotion was felt endogenously 
(M = .30, SD = .21) than if this emotion was felt exogenously (M = .14, SD = .21), F(1, 84) 
= 3.05, p = .04.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 for anger on a different type 
of task and with a different emotion induction method. Once more, decision makers feeling 
this negative other-focused emotion utilized less advice when the emotion context was 
endogenous instead of exogenous. Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect 
on advice taking does not reflect a generic effect of negatively valenced emotions. 
Decision makers feeling the self-focused emotion shame took more advice when the 
emotion context was endogenous instead of exogenous—a pattern exactly opposite from 
what we observed for anger. Moreover, experiencing a negative other-focused emotion 
(anger) resulted in less advice taking overall than experiencing a negative self-focused 
emotion (shame). To see whether these effects of emotion focus and of emotion context 
can also be generalized to positive emotions, we conducted Experiment 3. Experiment 3 
looked at two positively valenced emotions that differed in focus, namely the other-
focused emotion gratitude and the self-focused emotion pride.  
 
Experiment 3 
 
Method 
Eighty six undergraduate students (56 males and 30 females, Mage = 19.52, SD = 
1.57) participated in a series of unrelated studies for extra course credit. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Emotion: gratitude vs. pride) u 2 (Emotion 
Context: endogenous vs. exogenous) between-subjects design with advice taking as 
dependent variable. 
Participants assumed the role of a junior brand manager at a fast-moving 
consumer goods company. They were responsible for the sales of ice-cream in Europe and 
had to indicate whether they would recommend top management to maintain their current 
European branding strategy for ice cream or to adopt a new strategy instead. Participants 
were presented with a condensed summary of the marketing decision problem on which to 
base their answer. They were told that ice cream was one of the most important product 
categories of the company and that a (new) branding strategy had major and permanent 
consequences for the business. After receiving the market information, participants 
indicated the extent to which they would favor one branding strategy over the other on a 
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slide bar anchored ‘definitely maintain current strategy’ on the left and ‘definitely 
implement new strategy’ on the right that corresponded to 0 and 100 respectively on an 
underlying choice continuum. By default, the slide bar knob was located in the middle 
(50/50 - indifference). Next, participants read a scenario about another part of their job 
responsibilities, which was designed to induce gratitude or pride. The scenario read: 
A different part of your job as junior brand manager at [Company name] consists 
of developing and establishing new brands. This aspect has nothing to do with your tasks 
within the ice-cream branding. Recently, you have developed a new brand for the first 
time. This was a very difficult project that was perceived as being very important by your 
boss and colleagues.  
In the gratitude condition, participants subsequently read:  
Completely unexpected you received help from your colleague John, who put a lot 
of time and effort into making the project a success. Eventually the project achieved 
positive outcomes, something for which you appreciate your colleague John a lot. You are 
really happy with what John has done for you. 
In the pride condition, participants subsequently read:  
You put a lot of time and effort into developing the project into a success. 
Eventually the project achieved positive outcomes, something that is appreciated a lot by 
yourself, by your colleagues, and especially by your colleague John. John thinks it is really 
impressive what you have done. 
As an emotion manipulation check, participants then rated how much gratitude, 
pride, relief, anger, disappointment, and shame they would feel in the described situation 
on 11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Next, participants had 
to evaluate the ice cream case with a colleague. Their colleague offered information that 
consisted of three different comments, all containing specific arguments in favor of 
maintaining the current strategy. In the endogenous condition the colleague was the person 
from the scenario (John). In the exogenous condition the colleague did not know anything 
about the event described in the scenario. After receiving their colleague’s advice, 
participants again indicated their decision on the slide bar. After fulfilling all subsequent 
tasks, participants were thanked and debriefed. As in the previous studies, we used the 
Harvey and Fischer (1997) measure of advice taking to calculate our dependent variable. 
Because the advice was strongly in favor of the current strategy we equated it with a 
virtual position of 0 on the underlying choice continuum.  
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Emotion manipulation check. Our manipulation of gratitude and pride was 
successful: participants in the gratitude condition (M = 8.36, SD = 1.09) reported more 
gratitude than participants in the pride condition (M = 6.78, SD = 1.96), t(84) = 4.67, p < 
.01, and more gratitude than other emotions, all ts(44) > 5.01, ps < .01. Participants in the 
pride condition (M = 8.73, SD = 1.03) reported more pride than participants in the gratitude 
condition (M = 6.80, SD = 1.98), t(84) = 5.59, p < .01, and more pride than other emotions, 
all ts(40) > 4.45, ps < .01. The conditions did not differ on the other emotions. 
Advice taking. We hypothesized that feeling positive emotions would result in 
more advice taking when it concerned an other-focused instead of a self-focused emotion. 
Moreover, we hypothesized that feeling positive other-focused emotions would result in 
more advice taking in endogenous compared to exogenous situations, while feeling 
positive self-focused emotions would result in less advice taking in endogenous compared 
to exogenous situations. More specifically, we predicted that experiencing gratitude 
instead of pride would result in more advice taking; that experiencing endogenous (vs. 
exogenous) gratitude would result in more advice taking, while experiencing endogenous 
(vs. exogenous) pride would result in less advice taking.  
 
Figure 4.3   Study 3 – Mean advice taking values per condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.3. The findings supported our hypotheses. A 2 
(Emotion: gratitude vs. pride) u 2 (Emotion Context: endogenous vs. exogenous) ANOVA 
with advice taking as dependent variable showed a significant main effect of Emotion, F(1, 
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82) = 3.42, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. Participants in the gratitude condition (M = .31, SD = .27) 
used significantly more advice compared to participants in the pride condition (M = .18, 
SD = .44). We did not find a significant main effect of Emotion Context, F(1, 82) < .01, p 
= .98, ηp2 < .01. Importantly, the results showed a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 82) 
= 6.68, p < .01, ηp2 = .08. The effects of gratitude and pride on advice taking behavior 
differed for endogenous and exogenous influences. Participants in the gratitude condition 
utilized more advice if this emotion was felt endogenously (M = .42, SD = .33) than if this 
emotion was felt exogenously (M = .22, SD = .17), F(1, 84) = 3.56, p = .03. In contrast, 
participants in the pride condition utilized significantly less advice if this emotion was felt 
endogenously (M = .08, SD = .54) than if this emotion was felt exogenously (M = .28, SD 
= .29), F(3, 82) = 3.14, p = .04.  
 
 
Table 4.2   Advice taking means and standard deviations as a function of Emotion and 
Emotion Context in Experiments 1 to 3 
Experiment 
Emotion 
 
Emotion Context 
 
Endogenous 
M (SD)  
Exogenous 
M (SD) 
Experiment 1    
Gratitude 0.71 (0.29) > 0.44 (0.29) 
Anger 0.37 (0.23) < 0.53 (0.32) 
Experiment 2    
Anger 0.04 (0.21) < 0.24 (0.29) 
Shame 0.30 (0.21) > 0.14 (0.21) 
Experiment 3    
Gratitude 0.42 (0.33) > 0.22 (0.17) 
Pride 0.08 (0.54) < 0.28 (0.29) 
 
Note. Means separated by a “>” or “<” mark are significantly different with all ts > 3.05, ps < .05. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicates the findings of Experiment 1 for gratitude on a different 
type of task and with a different emotion induction method. Once more, decision makers 
feeling this positive other-focused emotion utilized more advice when the emotion context 
was endogenous instead of exogenous. Experiment 3 furthermore revealed that this effect 
on advice taking does not reflect a generic influence of positively valenced emotions. We 
found that decision makers experiencing the positive self-focused emotion pride took less 
advice in an endogenous compared to an exogenous context—a pattern exactly opposite 
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from what we observed for gratitude. Moreover, experiencing a positive other-focused 
emotion (gratitude) resulted in more advice taking overall than experiencing a negative 
self-focused emotion (pride). A summary of the results of Experiments 1-3 can be found in 
Table 4.2. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Few people make decisions in a social vacuum. Instead, they often seek advice 
from other people to aid their decision making. The present research reveals that the way 
in which decision makers utilize this advice depends on specific characteristics of the 
emotion that they experience when receiving advice. Not only the negativity or positivity 
of an emotion, but also the questions whether an emotion is focused upon another person 
or upon the decision maker, and whether the emotion is relevant for the decision at hand or 
not, play an important role in the understanding of emotions in advice. Together, the three 
factors valence, focus, and context explain the effects that an emotion will have on advice 
taking. 
Three experiments clearly support the notion that emotions experienced by a 
decision maker influence advice taking. Using different emotion inductions and different 
advice tasks, we repeatedly found that the valence and focus of an emotion, together with 
its emotion context, affect the advice taking process. In Experiment 1, two other-focused 
emotions were induced with an autobiographical recall procedure, and advice taking was 
measured on a judgment task. Decision makers experiencing the positive other-focused 
emotion gratitude took more advice when the emotion context was endogenous compared 
to exogenous, whereas decision makers experiencing the negative other-focused emotion 
anger took less advice when the emotion context was endogenous compared to exogenous. 
In Experiment 2, a negative self-focused and other-focused emotion were induced with a 
scenario, and advice taking was measured on a choice task. The other-focused emotion 
anger and the self-focused emotion shame were found to have divergent effects on advice 
taking dependent on their influence. The findings revealed that experiencing a negative 
self-focused emotion endogenously instead of exogenously resulted in more advice taking, 
whereas experiencing a negative other-focused emotion endogenously instead of 
exogenously resulted in less advice taking. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that this effect 
can be generalized beyond negative emotions to positive emotions. A positive self-focused 
and other-focused emotion were induced with a scenario, and advice taking was again 
measured on a choice task. The results demonstrated that experiencing a positive self-
focused emotion (pride) endogenously instead of exogenously resulted in less advice 
taking, whereas experiencing a positive other-focused emotion (gratitude) endogenously 
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instead of exogenously resulted in more advice taking. Taken together, the results of these 
three experiments suggest that the role of emotions in advice taking can only be fully 
understood when taking their valence, focus, and context into account.  
These findings constitute an important contribution to the development of an 
understanding of advice taking. Prior research has found that advice is often 
underweighted (Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), and the stream of research on 
advice taking has shown multiple factors to contribute to this effect (see for example, 
Gino, 2008; Schrah, Dalal & Sniezek, 2006; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). Yet, even though 
emotions have been shown repeatedly to play a distinct role in decision making, hardly any 
research has considered the role of emotions in advice taking. A noted exception is the 
work by Gino and Schweitzer (2008) who recently made a first step towards an 
understanding of emotions in advice taking by showing that exogenous emotions of 
opposing valence can exert differential effects on advice taking. The present work extends 
existing research on the factors that influence advice taking by explaining how emotions 
exert distinct influences on advice taking.  
One implication of our findings is that other-focused and self-focused emotions 
can exert significant differential influences on decisions and behavior in general. Emotions 
can be separated on the basis of multiple aspects such as valence, basicality, or activity 
(Frijda, 1986; 2004; Izard, 1977). Focus is one of those aspects and has theoretically been 
acknowledged to be able to stimulate different action tendencies, decisions, and behaviors 
(Frijda, 2005; Smith, 2000). However, to our knowledge no empirical research thus far has 
explicitly addressed the influence of emotion focus on decisions or behavior. The present 
experiments are the first empirical evidence revealing that other-focused and self-focused 
emotions can have differential effects on decision making. For that reason, our research 
may contribute to a new stream of research on the role of focus in emotions, decision 
making, and organizational behavior.  
The study of both endogenous and exogenous emotion influences has relevance 
that goes beyond the specific advice taking setting. The distinction that we made between 
exogenous and endogenous influences has been made theoretically (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006), but our studies are one of the first to simultaneously 
examine the endogenous and exogenous influences of emotions. In some situations, 
endogenous and exogenous influences may be similar. For example, guilt has been shown 
motivate prosocial decisions both when being endogenously studied and when being 
exogenously studied (De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2010; Ketelaar & 
Au, 2003). However, as the present research demonstrates, the distinction can also explain 
differences in observed behavior in multiple situations. For example, we found that the 
endogenous influences of anger and pride do not have the same advice discounting effects 
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as their exogenous influences. Similarly, endogenous influences of shame and gratitude 
appear not to have the same advice taking effects as exogenous influences. In view of these 
results it seems safe to suggest that, for a complete understanding of emotions in decision 
making, more studies of emotion context taking both exogenous and endogenous 
influences into account are necessary. 
The present work also contributes to our understanding of emotions in managerial 
decision making and in work settings. Prior work has found that emotions often arise in 
organizational settings and that these emotions can influence subsequent organizational 
behavior and decision making (see e.g., Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Brief & 
Weiss, 2002). The present findings suggest that these emotions have effects on advice 
taking that people may not be aware of. Employees or managers can experience emotions 
concerning their own work or motivations, but also emotions concerning the work or 
motivations of colleagues, employees, or bosses. In addition, they may experience work-
related emotions resulting from events at work, but may also experience work-unrelated 
emotions resulting from events for example at home. The current research explains how all 
these kind of emotions, whether related or unrelated to the decision at hand, may influence 
advice taking and in turn decision outcomes in variable ways. For example, our work 
suggests that angry feelings towards a boss or a colleague may result in less advice taking 
in a work related decision, and that shame feelings related to work may stimulate less 
advice taking in domestic decisions. This knowledge can help managers understand and 
improve their own and their employees’ decisions. 
In sum, advice taking has been understood to be influenced by characteristics of 
the decision maker, of the advisor, and of the advice itself. Until now hardly any research 
has considered advice taking as a more emotional process. At present, we have shed some 
light upon this understudied question. The current findings suggest that it is necessary to 
look beyond valence, to other characteristics of an emotion to be able to understand where 
its effect on advice taking (or on decision making in general) originates in. Upon receiving 
a piece of advice we should be alert of our feelings and where they stem from. Only then 
will we be able to let our emotions help us make well-informed decisions. 
  
  
Chapter 5  
Discussion 
 
 
Using advice in decision making is omnipresent for all sorts of decisions ranging from 
what to wear to a party to deciding whether or not to sell off your company. Traditional 
research on decision making has failed to systematically study the influence that social 
interactions about a decision problem can have the decision outcome (e.g. Payne, Bettman, 
& Johnson, 1993). A separate literature stream about advice giving and taking emerged in 
order to model a decision making structure where one person is responsible for the final 
decision, but seeks the opinion from one or more other persons as input in his decision 
making process. The field is still relatively young, it is about two and a half decades old, 
and no comprehensive theory of advice taking exists (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). In fact, a 
breadth of research questions have been studied thus far and the research questions 
addressed in the empirical chapters of this dissertation are no exception. This thesis a 
collection of three empirical papers about advice taking in marketing that each studies a 
specific topic within the advice taking domain and contributes to it in its own right. 
 
Summary of main findings  
 In Chapter 2, we studied the effect of a specific advisor characteristic on advice 
taking. In the literature several advisor characteristics are documented that have been 
found to positively affect advice taking: advisor expertise (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; 
Jungermann & Fischer, 1997), advisor reputation (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) and advisor 
confidence (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2004). Decision makers 
actually use advisor reputation and confidence as a cue to infer advisor expertise (Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2004). Decision 
makers have also been found to take more advice from advisors who have more life 
experience, are better educated, wiser, and older than themselves (Feng & MacGeorge, 
2006). The presence of one of all of these factors can be explained as rational reasons for 
decision makers to rely more on an advisor’s recommendation. In Chapter 2 we discovered 
a factor for which this reasoning does not hold: advisor wealth. If wealth is the result of 
personal successes and achievement, then it could logically also be used as a cue to infer 
advisor expertise, on certain tasks. In the majority of experiments reported in Chapter 2, 
however, wealth was ‘stripped’ from these inferences as we explicitly stated that the 
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wealthy advisor in our scenario studies became rich by winning a lottery some time ago. 
Interestingly, even when decision makers explicitly stated that this wealthy advisor would 
not have a lot of expertise about the decision task at hand, they were still more reliant on 
his advice than on the advice of someone who was considered to have more expertise. 
They were seemingly unaware how advisor wealth influenced their behavior. We found 
that the advisor wealth effect was mediated by (perceived) power of the advisor. The 
wealthy advisor holds power in the sense that he is able to get whatever he wants and is 
able to control his environment, which is commonly considered to be a good thing. A 
wealth = power = good association, we argue, might therefore be the underlying process 
operating here. This association renders decision makers unable to sufficiently discount 
advice they receive from a rich person, even when he lacks the relevant expertise to 
actually offer a high-quality piece of advice 
 In Chapter 3, we studied the effect of a specific advice characteristic on advice 
taking. Whereas in many real-life advice situations, advisors offer a specific justification 
for their advice (embedded in the advice message), empirical studies of advice taking to 
date have not looked at this facet of advice to make out what its effect on advice utilization 
could be. In line with the dual-processes model of decision making that distinguishes two 
systems used in decision making, the intuitive system (or System 1) and the analytic 
system (or System 2) (Kahneman, 2003), advice can be justified by intuitive or analytic 
arguments. Intuitive decision making traditionally does not have a strong reputation, but 
more recent work suggests that intuition can be as good as, or even superior to analysis. 
We were therefore unable to predict up front what the effect of intuitive or analytic advice 
would be on the opinion of a decision maker. What we found is that intuitive advice was 
discounted variably, dependent on the seniority of the advisor and the type of marketing 
problem for which the advice was given. On a product go/no-go task, intuitive advice from 
a colleague was completely discounted, whereas the same advice offered without any 
justification resulted in significant advice utilization. Analytic advice, on the other hand, 
was in turn significantly more influential than advice without any justification. In a second 
experiment we found that the detrimental effect of intuitive advice completely disappeared 
if this advice was offered by an advisor who was more senior than the decision maker. In a 
third experiment, where we used a different type of marketing problem—a movie selection 
task—we found that the influence of intuitive advice could even outweigh the influence of 
analytic advice. These results suggest that decision makers generally doubt the value of 
intuitive advice and only assess it as accurate if other cues in the advice setting (such as 
advisor seniority and task characteristics) corroborate this. 
 In Chapter 4, we studied the effect of a specific decision maker characteristic on 
advice taking. In the general decision making literature, multiple studies have been 
reported that document the influence of emotions on individual decision making (for a 
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review see Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003). But, with the exception of one paper by 
Gino and Schweitzer (2008), the role that emotions play in advice taking has not been 
studied. The knowledge that advice taking in organizations is very common and that the 
importance of emotions in organizational settings is highlighted extensively in the 
literature (see e.g. Judge & Ilies, 2004) served as a major impetus for us to try to develop a 
more thorough understanding of the role that emotions play in advice taking. We studied 
the effect of four different emotions: gratitude, anger, shame, and pride on advice taking. 
These emotions differ not only on valence (i.e. whether they are positive or negative), but 
moreover on their focus (self- or other-focus) and context (endogenous or exogenous). 
Other-focused emotions (gratitude and anger) mainly concern appraisals dependent on 
other people, and thus may exert different influences on interpersonal behavior such as 
advice taking, compared to self-focused emotions that concern actions of oneself (pride 
and shame). Moreover, we also expected divergent effects of emotions on advice taking 
dependent on whether the emotion context is endogenous concerning behaviors in 
situations that are related to the emotion-causing event, or exogenous concerning behaviors 
in situations that are not related to the emotion-causing event. Gino and Schweitzer (2008) 
found that even exogenous emotions that actually have nothing to do with the advice 
situation, can have a positive or negative effect on advice utilization. Across three 
experiments, we found that, contingent on their valence, other-focused emotions exerted a 
stronger positive or negative effect on advice taking than self-focused emotions 
(irrespective of their context). Moreover, we found that experiencing endogenous (vs. 
exogenous) anger resulted in less advice utilization, whereas experiencing endogenous (vs. 
exogenous) shame resulted in more advice utilization. In addition, we found that 
experiencing endogenous (vs. exogenous) pride resulted in less advice utilization, whereas 
experiencing endogenous (vs. exogenous) gratitude resulted in more advice utilization. The 
pattern of advice taking for emotions of the same valence was thus found to be exactly 
opposite for endogenous and exogenous influences, dependent on whether the emotion was 
self- or other-focused. 
 
Connecting thread 
 Even though the empirical chapters of this dissertation are in fact standalone 
scientific articles about advice taking, there is a tie that bonds them. They all find and 
discuss variable utilization of the exact same advice based on the manipulation of one 
element in the advice situation; advisor wealth, advice justification and emotions 
experienced by the decision maker. We learn that decision makers who seek advice may 
end up making different decisions dependent on what is on the bank account of their 
advisor, whether or not an intuitive justification for the advice is offered, or the specific 
emotion they are experiencing when receiving the advice (keeping the actual advice 
message unaffected). Whereas I deem the motives that seem to underlie variable utilization 
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of intuitive advice generally appropriate (intuition is by definition not rational, so decision 
makers cannot rationally assume it is always accurate), another commonality between two 
of the chapters is that variable utilization of advice based on advisor wealth or based on 
feeling grateful, angry, proud or ashamed because of an earlier (unrelated) incident cannot 
simply be explained by a rationality argument. 
 
Scientific contribution 
 The general scientific contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, the 
dissertation contributes to universal knowledge about judgment and decision making. The 
findings reported in Chapter 2 demonstrate once again, in the domain of advice taking, the 
important role that unconscious processes play in (consumer) decision making as we 
demonstrate that decision makers are influenced by a superficial cue (advisor wealth) 
without their apparent awareness. The findings reported in Chapter 3 extend general 
research about dual-process decision making by looking at the effect that someone else´s 
intuition and analysis, instead of a decision maker´s own intuition and analysis, have on an 
individual decision maker´s opinion. Lastly, the findings reported in Chapter 4 contribute 
to prior work that found that emotions override rational thinking and decision making and 
extend this to the domain of advice taking. 
 Second, the dissertation contributes to the general theory development in the 
advice taking domain by addressing three conceptually different research topics. We first 
add that decision makers tend to take more advice from a wealthy advisor, even if he is 
considered not to have expertise about the advice problem at hand. This contradicts with 
the general finding that decision makers take more advice from someone who is 
considered to have more task-relevant expertise (see Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, 
Schrah, & Dalal, 2004). Second, we add that the same advice message can be evaluated 
differently dependent on the way in which it is justified, either by intuition or by analysis, 
and that intuitive advice in particular is utilized variably dependent on advisor seniority 
and the type of (marketing) problem at hand. This is the first time that research has looked 
at the influence of a “lower-order” advice facet, the justification for the offered advice, on 
advice taking. Given that in real life advice is seldom offered without an explanation for it, 
our findings are an important first step in getting a better understanding of the influence of 
different advice facts on advice utilization. Third, we broaden our knowledge of the 
influence of specific emotions on advice taking. Besides demonstrating that other-focused 
emotions exert a stronger positive or negative effect on advice taking than self-focused 
emotions, we establish that emotions of the same valence that are endogenous or 
exogenous to the decision context exert a differential effect on advice taking dependent on 
whether they are self- or other-focused. A decision maker experiencing endogenous (vs. 
exogenous) anger (a negative other-focused emotion) will take less advice, whereas a 
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decision maker experiencing endogenous (vs. exogenous) shame (a negative self-focused 
emotion) will take more advice. In a similar vein, a decision maker experiencing 
endogenous (vs. exogenous) gratitude (a positive other-focused emotion) will take more 
advice, whereas a decision maker experiencing endogenous (vs. exogenous) pride (a 
positive self-focused emotion) will take less advice. This is the first time that research has 
investigated the influence that discrete emotions have on advice taking in such a 
comprehensive way. 
 
Managerial relevance 
 More often than not, (marketing) managers seek advice from others when they 
need to make important decisions. This advice can come from a colleague (as in the 
experiments reported in Chapter 3 and 4) or from an external party. Various industries, 
from advertising to consulting, build an entire business on the ability to make the advice 
they provide to their consumers valued and utilized. As advice giving and taking is 
omnipresent in organizations, it is insightful for (marketing) practitioners to learn about the 
factors that lead to an increase or decrease in advice taking. The results of the second 
chapter are suggestive of the fact that a consultant´s anecdotic slick Armani suit and 
expensive BMW parked in front of the office indeed contribute to increased advice taking. 
Moreover, from this dissertation we learn that justifying the advice in a way that is 
appropriate to the marketing problem at hand and to the seniority of the advisor also 
promotes advice taking. Finally, we find that advisors such as consultants and policy 
makers, may generate or induce (or, in contrast, avoid) a specific emotion to exert a 
stronger influence on the final decision maker. 
 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 What I hoped to do by designing real-life marketing tasks as focal tasks in the 
experiments reported in this dissertation, is to make them more intuitively appealing to 
consumers and marketing practitioners, and perhaps a bit more externally valid. But even 
though I tried to mimic real-life situations best as possible, an artificial lab setting always 
remains different from any genuine everyday setting. Moreover, participants in our studies 
were business students and not marketing managers (yet). It could be that experienced 
practitioners would weigh intuitive (or analytic) advice differently, or would be better able 
to regulate their emotions when making important decisions. I hope that more research on 
these issues will follow, both in the lab using marketing managers, and in the field. 
 On a related note, in the experiments reported in this dissertation I do not measure 
decision quality. Decision makers typically seek advice to improve decision quality, so in 
the end that is what it is all about. In line with this, the accuracy of a decision maker’s 
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post-advice decision generally represents the output of the advice process (e.g. Gardner & 
Berry, 1995; Sniezek et al., 2004; Yaniv, 2004). Nevertheless, the tasks I used in my 
experimental studies did not allow for such measurement as there was not one ‘good’ and 
one ‘wrong’ answer (as is true for many real-life marketing decisions). Using a different 
type of task, one would have been able to say if specific degrees of advice utilization in  
decision making actually led to more accurate decisions or not. 
 Furthermore, I think it would be especially interesting to extend the paradigm I 
used in the third and fourth chapter to incorporate two or more advisors. When seeking 
advice it is not uncommon for decision makers to also get a ‘second opinion’. Prior 
research has looked into advice utilization from multiple advisors (see e.g. Budescu & 
Rantilla, 2000; Budescu et al., 2003; Savadori, Van Swol, & Sniezek, 2001), but 
combining this with the research topics addressed in this dissertation would be entirely 
novel and worthwhile. It would, for example, be interesting to see what kind of advice 
weighing rules decision makers apply when receiving intuitive advice from a senior and 
opposing analytic advice from a junior. It would also be interesting to find out what 
happens if a decision maker gets bad advice from someone he is grateful towards and 
opposing good advice from someone he is angry with. 
 Another suggestion for follow-up research would be to vary the alleged 
relationship between the decision maker and the advisor. In the present research the 
advisor was almost always a salesperson or acquaintance (Chapter 2) or another 
organizational member (Chapters 3 and 4). It would be interesting to find out if these are 
actually conservative tests of effects that would hold if there would be a stronger tie 
between decision maker and advisor (i.e. if they would be close friends or family 
members). Moreover, instead of capturing advice taking in an organization model (as we 
did), it would also be worthwhile to do so in a market model in which an external third 
party (a consultancy) is hired for giving advice to a marketing decision maker. In line with 
recent research that found that people value advice from others more when it costs money 
than when it is free (Gino, 2008), it would also be interesting to study any interactions with 
advisor fees, and advisor wealth or advice justification, for example. 
 
 I believe that research on advice taking has great potential to inform and be 
informed by other areas of (psychology) research. As research on advice taking is 
maturing, more and more possibilities for cross-fertilization arise that I trust will not stay 
untapped. With this dissertation I hope to have contributed to the ongoing development of 
a comprehensive theory of advice taking, in three distinctive ways. As there is great 
potential for future research, I hope my work will inspire others to further develop the 
field. 
 Appendix A 
Swasy´s (1979) Social Power Scales 
 
Reward power 
- If I do not comply with my advisor, I will not be rewarded 
- The only reason for doing as my advisor suggests is to obtain good things in 
return 
- I want to do as my advisor suggests only because of the good things he will give 
me for complying 
- My advisor has the ability to reward me (in some manner) if I do as he suggests 
- If I do not do as my advisor suggests I will not receive good things from him 
- I this situation I am dependent on my advisor’s willingness to grant me good 
things 
 
Coercive power  
- My advisor can harm me in some manner if I do not do as he suggests 
- If I do not do as my advisor suggests, he will punish me 
- Something bad will happen to me if I don’t do as my advisor suggests and he 
finds out 
- I had better do as my advisor suggests in order to prevent something bad from 
happening to me 
- My advisor might do something which is unpleasant to those who do not do as he 
suggests 
 
Expert power  
- I trust my advisor’s judgment 
- My advisor’s expertise makes him more likely to be right 
- My advisor has a lot of experience and usually knows best 
- My advisor knows best in this situation 
- My advisor’s knowledge usually makes him right 
- I trust my advisor’s judgment in this situation 
- In this situation I don’t know as much about what should be done as my advisor 
does 
- My advisor is intelligent 
 Appendix B 
Trust Inventory 
 
- I would give my advisor an important letter to mail after he mentions that he is 
stopping by the post office today 
- I could rely on information my advisor provides to me 
- If my advisor and I decided to meet for coffee, I would be certain he would be 
there 
- I would expect my advisor to tell me the truth if I asked him for feedback on an 
idea related to my job or studies 
- If my advisor was late to a meeting or an appointment, I would guess there was a 
good reason for the delay 
- My advisor would never intentionally misrepresent my point of view to others. 
- I would expect my advisor to pay me back if I loaned him $40 
- If my advisor laughed unexpectedly at something I did or said, I would know he 
was not being unkind 
- If my advisor gave me a compliment on my haircut I would believe he meant 
what was said 
- If my advisor borrowed something of value and returned it broken, he would offer 
to pay for the repairs 
 
Note. The trust inventory was adapted from Gino & Schweitzer (2008). 
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 Summary (in Dutch) 
Samenvatting 
 
 
Mensen zijn sociale wezens en vragen vaak om advies voor het nemen van bepaalde 
beslissingen. Dat kan voor iets simpels zijn zoals voor wat aan te trekken naar dat ene 
feestje, of voor iets meer complex zoals voor de vraag wel of niet je bedrijf te verkopen. 
Traditioneel onderzoek naar hoe mensen beslissingen nemen heeft het effect dat sociale 
interactie over een beslissingsprobleem kan hebben op de uiteindelijke beslissing veelal 
buiten beschouwing gelaten. Een opzichzelfstaande literatuurstroom over het geven en 
nemen van advies is geboren uit de noodzaak een beslissingstructuur te modelleren waarin 
één persoon verantwoordelijk is voor de uiteindelijke beslissing, maar advies vraagt aan 
een ander persoon (of aan meerdere personen) om hem in dit proces te helpen. Onderzoek 
op dit gebeid is relatief nieuw, het eerste artikel dateert uit 1986, en er bestaat nog geen 
allesomvattende theorie over adviesaanname. Veel verschillende onderzoeksvragen zijn 
reeds bestudeerd en de vragen die ik in de empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift 
behandel vormen daarop geen uitzondering. Deze dissertatie is een bundel van drie 
wetenschappelijke onderzoeken naar verschillende factoren die van invloed zijn op 
adviesaanname in marketing, die elk op geheel eigen wijze bijdraagt aan de ontwikkeling 
van de algemene adviesliteratuur. 
 
 In Hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen we de invloed van een specifieke eigenschap van de 
adviseur op adviesaanname. In de literatuur worden verschillende eigenschappen van 
adviseurs gedocumenteerd die adviesaanname op een positieve manier beïnvloeden: 
expertise, reputatie, en zekerheid (over het gegeven advies). Beslissingsnemers gebruiken 
de reputatie en zekerheid van een adviseur eigenlijk als een signaal dat deze adviseur 
expertise heeft. Beslissingsnemers nemen ook meer advies aan van adviseurs die meer 
levenservaring hebben, beter opgeleid zijn, of wijzer of ouder zijn dan zij zelf. De 
aanwezigheid van één of meer van deze factoren kunnen uitgelegd worden als rationele 
redenen om meer advies aan te nemen. In Hoofdstuk 2 ontdekken we een eigenschap 
waarvoor dit niet geldt: het kapitaal van de adviseur. Als dit opgebouwde kapitaal het 
resultaat is van persoonlijke successen, dan zou het logischerwijs ook een signaal kunnen 
zijn dat de adviseur expertise heeft (over bepaalde onderwerpen). Echter, in het 
meerendeel van de experimenten die wij rapporteren in Hoofdstuk 2, wordt kapitaal 
‘gestript’ van dergelijke inferenties, omdat de adviseur in onze scenario studies rijk is 
geworden door het winnen van een loterij. Waar beslissingsnemers zelf expliciet stellen 
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dat deze rijke adviseur weinig expertise heeft voor de beslissing die genomen moet 
worden, nemen ze wel significant meer advies aan van deze persoon dan van iemand die 
niet rijk is maar wel bevonden wordt meer expertise te hebben. Dit gedrag is ogenschijnlijk 
onbewust. We vinden dat dit effect gemedieerd wordt door de (waargenomen) macht van 
de adviseur. De rijke adviseur heeft macht in de zin dat hij kan krijgen wat hij wil en dat 
hij in staat is zijn omgeving te controleren. De kapitaal = macht = goed associatie is 
volgens ons de (onbewuste) associatie die men maakt. Deze associatie maakt 
beslissingsnemers incapabel om het advies dat ze krijgen van een rijke adviseur voldoende 
af te schrijven, zelfs wanneer hij geen expertise heeft. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we de invloed van een specifieke eigenschap van het 
advies op adviesaanname. In de werkelijkheid geven adviseurs meestal een onderbouwing 
voor het gegeven advies (vaak geïntegreerd in de advies boodschap), maar in de meeste 
empirische studies over adviesaanname wordt dit facet van advies niet belicht. In het kader 
van het duale-proces model van beslissingen nemen dat twee systemen onderscheidt 
waarmee mensen beslissingen nemen, het intuïtieve systeem en het analytische systeem, 
kan advies onderbouwd worden door intuïtieve of analytische argumenten. Intuïtief 
beslissingen nemen heeft traditioneel geen goed reputatie, maar meer recent werk 
suggereert dat intuïtie zo goed kan zijn als, of zelfs superieur kan zijn aan, analyse. Wij 
waren daarom a priori niet in staat om te voorspellen wat de invloed van intuïtief en 
analytisch advies zou zijn op adviesaanname. Onze resultaten laten zien dat intuïtief advies 
variabel aangenomen wordt, afhankelijk van de senioriteit van de adviseur en het type 
marketing probleem waarvoor advies wordt gegeven. Op een product go/no-go taak wordt 
intuïtief advies van een collega volledig afgeschreven, terwijl hetzelfde advies zonder 
enige onderbouwing leidt tot significante adviesaanname. Analytisch advies was op zijn 
buurt weer meer invloedrijk dan advies zonder enige onderbouwing. In een tweede 
experiment vinden we dat het negatieve effect van intuïtief advies op adviesaanname 
compleet verdwijnt als het advies wordt aangeboden door een senior (vs. junior) adviseur. 
In een derde experiment, waarin we een ander soort marketing taak gebruiken—een film 
selectie taak—vinden we dat de positieve invloed van intuïtief advies op adviesaanname 
zelfs groter kan zijn dan de invloed van analytisch advies. Deze resultaten suggereren dat 
beslissingsnemers over het algemeen de waarde van intuïtief advies in twijfel trekken, 
tenzij andere factoren in de advies setting (zoals senioriteit van de adviseur en type taak) 
persuaderen dat intuïtief advies accuraat kan zijn. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we de invloed van een specifieke eigenschap van de 
beslissingsnemer op adviesaanname. In de algemene literatuur over beslissingen nemen, 
worden meerdere studies gerapporteerd waarin wordt gevonden dat emoties een 
significante invloed hebben op de manier waarop een individu beslissingen neemt. Echter, 
één uitzondering daargelaten, is de rol die emoties spelen binnen adviesaanname nog niet 
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bestudeerd. De wetenschap dat adviesaanname binnen bedrijven veelvoorkomend is en dat 
de rol die emoties spelen in het bedrijfsleven veelvuldig belicht is vormde voor ons een 
grote drijfveer om de rol die emoties spelen in adviesaanname beter te begrijpen. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we het effect van vier verschillende emoties op adviesaanname: 
dankbaarheid, boosheid, trots, en schaamte. Emoties verschillen in valentie—ze kunnen 
positief of negatief geladen zijn (bijvoorbeeld dankbaarheid vs. boosheid). Daarnaast 
verschillen emoties in focus—ze kunnen op jezelf of op anderen gericht zijn (bijvoorbeeld 
trots (op jezelf) vs. (een ander) dankbaar zijn). Bovendien kunnen emoties verschillende 
invloeden hebben: endogene of exogene. Endogene invloeden van emoties zijn een 
integraal deel van de inspanningen om doelen te bereiken en zijn relevant voor 
beslissingen die gemaakt worden. Exogene invloeden van emoties zijn extern aan de 
inspanningen om doelen te bereiken en zijn in theorie niet relevant voor beslissingen die 
gemaakt worden. Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat positieve en negatieve exogene 
emoties, die dus theoretisch geen relevantie hebben voor de beslissing die gemaakt moet 
worden, in de praktijk evengoed een positief of negatief effect op adviesaanname kunnen 
hebben. In drie experimenten laten wij zien dat, om de invloed van emoties op 
adviesaanname helemaal te begrijpen, men moet kijken naar de combinatie van valentie, 
focus, en invloed (of context) van de emotie. We vinden dat het ervaren van een negatieve 
zelf-georiënteerde emotie (schaamte) leidt tot meer adviesaanname dan het ervaren van een 
negatieve ander-georiënteerde emotie (boosheid); en dat het ervaren van een positieve zelf-
georiënteerde emotie (trots) leidt tot minder adviesaanname dan het ervaren van een 
positieve ander-georiënteerde emotie (dankbaarheid). Bovendien vinden we dat het ervaren 
van endogene (vs. exogene) boosheid leidt tot minder adviesaanname, terwijl  het ervaren 
van endogene (vs. exogene) schaamte leidt tot meer adviesaanname. Ook vinden we dat 
het ervaren van endogene (vs. exogene) dankbaarheid leidt tot meer adviesaanname, terwijl  
het ervaren van endogene (vs. exogene) trots leidt tot minder adviesaanname. 
Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat het patroon van adviesaanname voor emoties met 
dezelfde valentie (positief of negatief) precies omgekeerd is voor endogene en exogene 
invloeden, afhankelijk van de (zelf- of ander-) focus van de emotie. 
  
Ik besluit dit proefschrift in Hoofdstuk 5 met een samenvatting van de 
beschouwing en de implicaties hiervan voor de adviesliteratuur. Bovendien geef ik aan wat 
de relevantie van mijn onderzoek is voor consumenten, managers en consultants, en geef 
ik suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek op het gebied van adviesaanname. Met deze 
dissertatie hoop ik bij te dragen aan de ontwikkeling van de adviesliteratuur op drie 
eigenwijze wijzes. Er is groot potentieel voor onderzoek op het gebied van advies en ik 
hoop dat mijn proefschrift anderen inspireert om dit onderzoeksdomein verder te 
ontplooien.
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EMPIRICAL PAPERS ABOUT ADVICE TAKING IN MARKETING 
Using advice in decision making is widespread for all sorts of important personal and
professional decisions. Yet, traditional research on individual decision making has failed to
systematically study the impact that social interactions about a decision problem can have
on the decision outcome. A separate literature stream about advice giving and taking
emerged in the 1980s in order to model a decision making structure where one person is
responsible for the final decision, but seeks advice from one or more other persons as input
in the decision making process. To date, a breadth of research questions have been addressed
in order to gradually develop a theory of advice taking. This dissertation is a bundle of three
empirical papers on advice taking in marketing that each studies a specific topic within the
advice taking domain. Using similar experimental methodologies, the papers bundled in
this thesis all find and discuss variable utilization of advice based on the manipulation of
one element in the advice situation: advisor wealth, advice justification, and emotions expe -
rienced by the decision maker. As such, each of the papers offers some interesting manage -
rial implications and contributes to the development of a more comprehensive theory of
advice taking in its own right.
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